Convergence in games with continua of equilibria
In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash e...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2020-10, Vol.90, p.25-30 |
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| container_title | Journal of mathematical economics |
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| creator | Bervoets, Sebastian Faure, Mathieu |
| description | In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of mathematical economics, 2020-10, Vol.90, p.25-30 |
| issn | 0304-4068 1873-1538 |
| language | eng |
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| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Best-response dynamics Continua of Nash equilibria Convergence Dynamical systems Economics and Finance Equilibrium Game theory Games Humanities and Social Sciences Public good Questions |
| title | Convergence in games with continua of equilibria |
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