A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes based on Index-of-Max Hashing
Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric s...
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| creator | Ghammamy, Loubna Karabinaz, Koray Lacharme, Patrick Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin |
| description | Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. The correctness and practical impact of our attacks are verified over the same dataset provided by the authors of these two schemes. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1109/TIFS.2020.2977533 |
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The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. 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(IEEE) 2020</rights><rights>Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c370t-90778b94f63887c0e69b9984da912622db0817fb237f551531c2ce7640805303</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c370t-90778b94f63887c0e69b9984da912622db0817fb237f551531c2ce7640805303</cites><orcidid>0000-0003-0042-8771 ; 0000-0001-9538-8877 ; 0000-0003-3438-1860</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9019657$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>230,314,776,780,792,881,27903,27904,54736</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9019657$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc><backlink>$$Uhttps://hal.science/hal-02937205$$DView record in HAL$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Ghammamy, Loubna</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Karabinaz, Koray</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lacharme, Patrick</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin</creatorcontrib><title>A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes based on Index-of-Max Hashing</title><title>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</title><addtitle>TIFS</addtitle><description>Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. 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(IEEE)</general><general>Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SC</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>7TB</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>JQ2</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>L~C</scope><scope>L~D</scope><scope>1XC</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0042-8771</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9538-8877</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3438-1860</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20200101</creationdate><title>A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes based on Index-of-Max Hashing</title><author>Ghammamy, Loubna ; Karabinaz, Koray ; Lacharme, Patrick ; Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c370t-90778b94f63887c0e69b9984da912622db0817fb237f551531c2ce7640805303</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Artificial Intelligence</topic><topic>Authentication</topic><topic>Authentication attack</topic><topic>Automatic Control Engineering</topic><topic>Bioinformatics</topic><topic>Biomedical imaging</topic><topic>Biometrics</topic><topic>Cancelable biometrics</topic><topic>Computation and Language</topic><topic>Computer Science</topic><topic>Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition</topic><topic>Cryptography</topic><topic>Cryptography and Security</topic><topic>Document and Text Processing</topic><topic>Feature extraction</topic><topic>Human-Computer Interaction</topic><topic>Image Processing</topic><topic>Index-of-Max hashing</topic><topic>Linkability attack</topic><topic>Locality sensitive hashing</topic><topic>Password</topic><topic>Permutations</topic><topic>Reversibility attack</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Ghammamy, Loubna</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Karabinaz, Koray</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lacharme, Patrick</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts</collection><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Mechanical & Transportation Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Computer Science Collection</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Academic</collection><collection>Computer and Information Systems Abstracts Professional</collection><collection>Hyper Article en Ligne (HAL)</collection><jtitle>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Ghammamy, Loubna</au><au>Karabinaz, Koray</au><au>Lacharme, Patrick</au><au>Thiry-Atighehchi, Kevin</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes based on Index-of-Max Hashing</atitle><jtitle>IEEE transactions on information forensics and security</jtitle><stitle>TIFS</stitle><date>2020-01-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>15</volume><spage>1</spage><epage>1</epage><pages>1-1</pages><issn>1556-6013</issn><eissn>1556-6021</eissn><coden>ITIFA6</coden><abstract>Cancelable biometric schemes generate secure biometric templates by combining user specific tokens and biometric data. The main objective is to create irreversible, unlinkable, and revocable templates, with high accuracy of comparison. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two recent cancelable biometric schemes based on a particular locality sensitive hashing function, index-of-max (IoM): Gaussian Random Projection-IoM (GRP-IoM) and Uniformly Random Permutation-IoM (URP-IoM). As originally proposed, these schemes were claimed to be resistant against reversibility, authentication, and linkability attacks under the stolen token scenario. We propose several attacks against GRP-IoM and URP-IoM, and argue that both schemes are severely vulnerable against authentication and linkability attacks. We also propose better, but not yet practical, reversibility attacks against GRP-IoM. 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| subjects | Artificial Intelligence Authentication Authentication attack Automatic Control Engineering Bioinformatics Biomedical imaging Biometrics Cancelable biometrics Computation and Language Computer Science Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Cryptography Cryptography and Security Document and Text Processing Feature extraction Human-Computer Interaction Image Processing Index-of-Max hashing Linkability attack Locality sensitive hashing Password Permutations Reversibility attack |
| title | A Cryptanalysis of Two Cancelable Biometric Schemes based on Index-of-Max Hashing |
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