Matching in the large: An experimental study

We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, p...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Games and economic behavior 2018-07, Vol.110, p.295-317
Hauptverfasser:	Chen, Yan, Jiang, Ming, Kesten, Onur, Robin, Stéphane, Zhu, Min
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economics and Finance Experiment Humanities and Social Sciences Matching Scale School choice
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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