Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection
We develop a political economy model that might explain discrepancies in environmental performance, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. They also vote on a tax that will be e...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Annales d'économie et de statistique 2014-01, Vol.115-116 (115/116), p.379-407 |
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| container_end_page | 407 |
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| container_issue | 115/116 |
| container_start_page | 379 |
| container_title | Annales d'économie et de statistique |
| container_volume | 115-116 |
| creator | Raffin, Natacha |
| description | We develop a political economy model that might explain discrepancies in environmental performance, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. They also vote on a tax that will be exclusively used to finance environmental protection. We show that the model may generate multiple equilibria, and agents' expectations may be self-fulfilling when public policy is endogenous. We then analyse the long-term implications of a public policy that would favour education and make it possible to select the higher equilibrium.
JEL: I28, H20, O16, O40, Q58 / KEY WORDS: Environmental Quality, Human Capital, Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Endogenous Public Policy, Education |
| doi_str_mv | 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.379 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Annales d'économie et de statistique, 2014-01, Vol.115-116 (115/116), p.379-407 |
| issn | 2115-4430 0769-489X 1968-3863 2272-6497 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_01385919v1 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Free E- Journals |
| subjects | Economic expectations Economics and Finance Education Environmental education Environmental policy Environmental pollution Environmental protection Environmental quality FEATURE ARTICLES Green economics Green taxes Humanities and Social Sciences Longevity Political economy Public policy Votes |
| title | Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection |
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