Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox
Consider the framework of topological aggregation introduced by Chichilnisky (Adv Math 37(2): 165-176, 1980). We prove that in this framework the twin paradox and the No Show paradox cannot be avoided. Anonymity and unanimity are not needed to obtain these results.
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Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2017-04, Vol.48 (4), p.707-715 |
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description | Consider the framework of topological aggregation introduced by Chichilnisky (Adv Math 37(2): 165-176, 1980). We prove that in this framework the twin paradox and the No Show paradox cannot be avoided. Anonymity and unanimity are not needed to obtain these results. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-017-1032-1 |
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subjects | Computer Science Economic models Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory International Political Economy Multiagent Systems Original Paper Preferences Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social choice Social Policy Studies Voters |
title | Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox |
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