On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard

We analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral hazard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholders decide for themselves on their health expenditures. The trade-off between ex ante risk sharing and ex post incentive compatibility is analyzed i...

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Veröffentlicht in:	IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc 2018-09, Vol.43 (2), p.137-185
Hauptverfasser:	Martinon, Pierre, Picard, Pierre, Raj, Anasuya
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic models Economics and Finance Finance Financial Services Health insurance Humanities and Social Sciences Insurance Moral hazard ORIGINAL ARTICLE Risk Management
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