Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Theoretical economics 2013, Vol.8 (1), p.95-123
Hauptverfasser:	Forges, Françoise, Vida, Péter
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bayesian analysis Bayesian game C72 cheap talk Communication communication equilibrium correlated equilibrium D70 Economic models Economic theory Equilibrium pre-play communication preplay communication Quantitative Finance Studies
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