Patents as Collateral
This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic dynamics & control 2010-06, Vol.34 (6), p.1094-1104 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
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| container_end_page | 1104 |
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| container_issue | 6 |
| container_start_page | 1094 |
| container_title | Journal of economic dynamics & control |
| container_volume | 34 |
| creator | Chatelain, Jean-Bernard Ralf, Kirsten Amable, Bruno |
| description | This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.004 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0165-1889 |
| ispartof | Journal of economic dynamics & control, 2010-06, Vol.34 (6), p.1094-1104 |
| issn | 0165-1889 1879-1743 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_hal_primary_oai_HAL_hal_00475854v1 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Collateral Collateral (Security) Collateral Patents Research and development Credit rationing Growth Innovation Credit rationing Economic models Economics and Finance Growth Growth rate Growth theory Humanities and Social Sciences Industrial organization Innovation Innovations R&D Research & development Research & development expenditures Research and Development Research policy Studies |
| title | Patents as Collateral |
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