Los efectos de la competencia local por fondos: El caso de los municipios en Chile/The Effects of the Local Competition for Funds: The Case of the Municipalities in Chile

El presente art??culo estudia los efectos de la competencia por fondos entre municipios chilenos. Para esto se entrevist?? a un grupo de funcionarios municipales con experiencia en la postulaci??n al Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR). Pese a su relevancia local, la competencia por fondos de inversi??n ha sido com??nmente analizada desde una perspectiva jer??rquica y aislada de los procesos administrativos acontecidos pre y posdistribuci??n. El art??culo muestra que la competencia por el FNDR, pese a asegurar la rentabilidad social de los proyectos, favorecer??a a los municipios con mayor poblaci??n y recursos, dificultando el cumplimiento de sus objetivos. Adem??s, los proyectos tender??an a buscar el benepl??cito del gobierno central en detrimento de lo propuesto localmente, evidenciando una asimetr??a entre los funcionarios del gobierno local y central. Por ??ltimo, la competencia incentivar??a la postulaci??n de proyectos de menor magnitud y f??cilmente visibles por la poblaci??n, lo que afectar??a el desarrollo de los municipios y las comunidades que las habitan. Palabras clave: administraci??n municipal, finanzas locales, competencia, sector p??blico, funcionarios p??blicos. The following article studies the effects of the competition for funds among Chilean municipalities. For this, a group of local officers with experience bidding to the Fondo de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) was interviewed. Regardless of its local relevance the competition for capital funds has been commonly scrutinized from a hierarchical perspective isolated from the administrative processes that took place before and after the fund's distribution. The article shows that the competition for FNDR funds, despite securing the social return of investment, would favour better-off municipalities with larger populations jeopardizing the accomplishment of its objectives. Also, local projects would tend to seek central government compliance at the expense of what was locally proposed, evidencing an asymmetry between local and central officers. Finally, the competition would encourage the design of projects from a smaller magnitude and more visible for the community, thus affecting the development of the municipalities and the communities that inhabit them. Keywords: municipal administration, local finances, competition, public sector, civil servants.