The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?
The rules regarding shareholder rights plans, also known as “poison pills”, ensure that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time has grown in length from twenty to...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | McGill law journal 2015-09, Vol.61 (1), p.1-29 |
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| container_title | McGill law journal |
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| creator | Anand, Anita |
| description | The rules regarding shareholder rights plans, also known as “poison pills”, ensure
that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period
of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time
has grown in length from twenty to thirty-five days and the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) have recently proposed a 120-day period during which takeover bids
would remain open. In light of the historical rationale of takeover bid law to protect the
interests of target shareholders, this article argues that the legal regime should not allow
an extensive bid period of 120 days. While other aspects of the CSA proposal are sound, a
lengthy bid period disadvantages both target shareholders and bidders and will ultimately
deter bids from occurring. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7202/1035384ar |
| format | Article |
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that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period
of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time
has grown in length from twenty to thirty-five days and the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) have recently proposed a 120-day period during which takeover bids
would remain open. In light of the historical rationale of takeover bid law to protect the
interests of target shareholders, this article argues that the legal regime should not allow
an extensive bid period of 120 days. While other aspects of the CSA proposal are sound, a
lengthy bid period disadvantages both target shareholders and bidders and will ultimately
deter bids from occurring.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0024-9041</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1920-6356</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.7202/1035384ar</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Montreal: McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill</publisher><subject>Anti takeover strategy ; Bids ; Corporation law ; Directors ; Hostile takeovers ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Legal status, laws, etc ; Negotiation ; Poison pill strategy ; Securities ; Shareholders rights ; Social aspects ; Stockholders ; Tender offers ; Tender offers (Securities)</subject><ispartof>McGill law journal, 2015-09, Vol.61 (1), p.1-29</ispartof><rights>Copyright © AnitaAnand, 2015</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2015 McGill Law Journal (Canada)</rights><rights>Copyright McGill University Faculty of Law Sep 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c392r-5834f4ebd1439b919a4f78cb4b462cfb76a06401cef78add8cd3ae6c78e805993</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.erudit.org/en/journals/mlj/2015-mlj02390/1035384ar.pdf$$EPDF$$P50$$Gerudit$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttp://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1035384ar$$EHTML$$P50$$Gerudit$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,79569,79576</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Anand, Anita</creatorcontrib><title>The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?</title><title>McGill law journal</title><description>The rules regarding shareholder rights plans, also known as “poison pills”, ensure
that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period
of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time
has grown in length from twenty to thirty-five days and the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) have recently proposed a 120-day period during which takeover bids
would remain open. In light of the historical rationale of takeover bid law to protect the
interests of target shareholders, this article argues that the legal regime should not allow
an extensive bid period of 120 days. While other aspects of the CSA proposal are sound, a
lengthy bid period disadvantages both target shareholders and bidders and will ultimately
deter bids from occurring.</description><subject>Anti takeover strategy</subject><subject>Bids</subject><subject>Corporation law</subject><subject>Directors</subject><subject>Hostile takeovers</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Legal status, laws, etc</subject><subject>Negotiation</subject><subject>Poison pill strategy</subject><subject>Securities</subject><subject>Shareholders rights</subject><subject>Social aspects</subject><subject>Stockholders</subject><subject>Tender offers</subject><subject>Tender offers (Securities)</subject><issn>0024-9041</issn><issn>1920-6356</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNptkktv1DAUhS0EEkNhwS_AghWLtHbsPMwGDaMOrVSVCoa15djXqUsST-0E0X-Pp9OnFHlh6fi751zda4TeU3JY5SQ_ooQVrOYqvEALKnKSlawoX6IFITnPBOH0NXoT4xUhlJSCL9B6cwl4PY1TAOwtvvAu-gFfuK6L2A14pQZl1Be8TM8b9Qf8Xwj4mzP4J1gf-ojPAQyYr2_RK6u6CO_u7gP0e328WZ1kZz--n66WZ5lmIg9ZUTNuOTSGciYaQYXitqp1wxte5to2ValIyQnVkGRlTK0NU1DqqoaaFEKwA_Rp77sN_nqCOMorP4UhRUpaVaTmtEgTeKBa1YF0g_VjULp3Ucsl57ymyYwmKpuhWhggqM4PYF2Sn_EfZ3i9ddfyKXQ4A6VjoHd61vXzs4LEjPBvbNUUozz9dT7L6uBjDGDlNrhehRtJidytXz6sP7Enezb0bpSqdXE7yggq6Mvbtm5lH1ppvNuVM0bLeyw5UZrnu5Gnj5KsPuytIEwmVT2G3of9B-wBvqg</recordid><startdate>20150901</startdate><enddate>20150901</enddate><creator>Anand, Anita</creator><general>McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill</general><general>McGill Law Journal (Canada)</general><general>McGill University Faculty of Law</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>ISN</scope><scope>ILT</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20150901</creationdate><title>The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?</title><author>Anand, Anita</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c392r-5834f4ebd1439b919a4f78cb4b462cfb76a06401cef78add8cd3ae6c78e805993</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Anti takeover strategy</topic><topic>Bids</topic><topic>Corporation law</topic><topic>Directors</topic><topic>Hostile takeovers</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Legal status, laws, etc</topic><topic>Negotiation</topic><topic>Poison pill strategy</topic><topic>Securities</topic><topic>Shareholders rights</topic><topic>Social aspects</topic><topic>Stockholders</topic><topic>Tender offers</topic><topic>Tender offers (Securities)</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Anand, Anita</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale In Context: Canada</collection><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><jtitle>McGill law journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Anand, Anita</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed?</atitle><jtitle>McGill law journal</jtitle><date>2015-09-01</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>61</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>29</epage><pages>1-29</pages><issn>0024-9041</issn><eissn>1920-6356</eissn><abstract>The rules regarding shareholder rights plans, also known as “poison pills”, ensure
that boards of directors facing a hostile takeover bid can retain a poison pill for a period
of time in order to search for other potential offers. Over the years, the period of time
has grown in length from twenty to thirty-five days and the Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA) have recently proposed a 120-day period during which takeover bids
would remain open. In light of the historical rationale of takeover bid law to protect the
interests of target shareholders, this article argues that the legal regime should not allow
an extensive bid period of 120 days. While other aspects of the CSA proposal are sound, a
lengthy bid period disadvantages both target shareholders and bidders and will ultimately
deter bids from occurring.</abstract><cop>Montreal</cop><pub>McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill</pub><doi>10.7202/1035384ar</doi><tpages>29</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0024-9041 |
| ispartof | McGill law journal, 2015-09, Vol.61 (1), p.1-29 |
| issn | 0024-9041 1920-6356 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_gale_infotracmisc_A444818051 |
| source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Erudit Open Access Journals |
| subjects | Anti takeover strategy Bids Corporation law Directors Hostile takeovers Laws, regulations and rules Legal status, laws, etc Negotiation Poison pill strategy Securities Shareholders rights Social aspects Stockholders Tender offers Tender offers (Securities) |
| title | The Future of Poison Pills in Canada: Are Takeover Bid Reforms Needed? |
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