THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits agai...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Michigan law review 2011-03, Vol.109 (5), p.683-732 |
|---|---|
| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 732 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 5 |
| container_start_page | 683 |
| container_title | Michigan law review |
| container_volume | 109 |
| creator | Shelanski, Howard A. |
| description | The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit-Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end. |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_gale_infotracgeneralonefile_A252739966</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A252739966</galeid><informt_id>10.3316/agispt.20191212021527</informt_id><jstor_id>25801852</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>A252739966</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-g406t-cea38f63d3a33e0bbbef6d77e86001254f15e1ccc480b020558c34c2c5012adc3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNptj09Pg0AQxTdGEyv6EUyInjH7h4XliEhbEkKTlp43y7LgNgXqgge_vWvRg0kzh5m8-b03mSuwQBGJPEZpeA0WEOLAw5j4t-BuHA8QQkQJWgBUrlM3iXepu9xs3W36GudxkWTFyo2LMiu3-11ppze7We3zuMw2xT24acRxVA-_3QH7ZVomay_frLIkzr3Wh8HkSSUIawJSE0GIglVVqSaow1CxwN7G1G8QVUhK6TNYQQwpZZL4Ektqt6KWxAFPc-7JDB-fapz4Yfg0vT3JGY18nxH7jgOeZ6gVR8V13wyTEbLTo-QxpjgkURQElvIuUK3qlRHHoVeNtvI__uUCb6tWnZYXDevZYDo9cdHq8TTxUQkj38_2szyYlteD5ghyQlDwh2GIIoQRhhj95DngcY46jNNg-MnoTpgvjimDiFFMvgGEFohk</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>859448322</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION</title><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Complete</source><source>JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing</source><source>EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals</source><creator>Shelanski, Howard A.</creator><creatorcontrib>Shelanski, Howard A.</creatorcontrib><description>The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit-Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0026-2234</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1939-8557</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Ann Arbor: Michigan Law Review Association</publisher><subject>Administrative agencies ; Antitrust ; Antitrust law ; Antitrust laws ; Commercial regulation ; Competition ; Cost control ; Court decisions and opinions ; Economic aspects ; Economic conditions ; Economic regulation ; Enforcement ; Evaluation ; Government regulation ; Immunity ; Industrial regulation ; Law and legislation ; Plaintiffs ; Price regulation ; Privileges and immunities ; Regulated industries ; Regulation ; Securities and Exchange Commission regulation ; Statutory law ; Stock exchanges ; Supreme Court decisions ; U.S. states</subject><ispartof>Michigan law review, 2011-03, Vol.109 (5), p.683-732</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2011 Michigan Law Review Association</rights><rights>Copyright Michigan Law Review Association Mar 2011</rights><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25801852$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/25801852$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Shelanski, Howard A.</creatorcontrib><title>THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION</title><title>Michigan law review</title><description>The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit-Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end.</description><subject>Administrative agencies</subject><subject>Antitrust</subject><subject>Antitrust law</subject><subject>Antitrust laws</subject><subject>Commercial regulation</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Cost control</subject><subject>Court decisions and opinions</subject><subject>Economic aspects</subject><subject>Economic conditions</subject><subject>Economic regulation</subject><subject>Enforcement</subject><subject>Evaluation</subject><subject>Government regulation</subject><subject>Immunity</subject><subject>Industrial regulation</subject><subject>Law and legislation</subject><subject>Plaintiffs</subject><subject>Price regulation</subject><subject>Privileges and immunities</subject><subject>Regulated industries</subject><subject>Regulation</subject><subject>Securities and Exchange Commission regulation</subject><subject>Statutory law</subject><subject>Stock exchanges</subject><subject>Supreme Court decisions</subject><subject>U.S. states</subject><issn>0026-2234</issn><issn>1939-8557</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2011</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNptj09Pg0AQxTdGEyv6EUyInjH7h4XliEhbEkKTlp43y7LgNgXqgge_vWvRg0kzh5m8-b03mSuwQBGJPEZpeA0WEOLAw5j4t-BuHA8QQkQJWgBUrlM3iXepu9xs3W36GudxkWTFyo2LMiu3-11ppze7We3zuMw2xT24acRxVA-_3QH7ZVomay_frLIkzr3Wh8HkSSUIawJSE0GIglVVqSaow1CxwN7G1G8QVUhK6TNYQQwpZZL4Ektqt6KWxAFPc-7JDB-fapz4Yfg0vT3JGY18nxH7jgOeZ6gVR8V13wyTEbLTo-QxpjgkURQElvIuUK3qlRHHoVeNtvI__uUCb6tWnZYXDevZYDo9cdHq8TTxUQkj38_2szyYlteD5ghyQlDwh2GIIoQRhhj95DngcY46jNNg-MnoTpgvjimDiFFMvgGEFohk</recordid><startdate>20110301</startdate><enddate>20110301</enddate><creator>Shelanski, Howard A.</creator><general>Michigan Law Review Association</general><scope>ILT</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>4U-</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>S0X</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20110301</creationdate><title>THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION</title><author>Shelanski, Howard A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g406t-cea38f63d3a33e0bbbef6d77e86001254f15e1ccc480b020558c34c2c5012adc3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2011</creationdate><topic>Administrative agencies</topic><topic>Antitrust</topic><topic>Antitrust law</topic><topic>Antitrust laws</topic><topic>Commercial regulation</topic><topic>Competition</topic><topic>Cost control</topic><topic>Court decisions and opinions</topic><topic>Economic aspects</topic><topic>Economic conditions</topic><topic>Economic regulation</topic><topic>Enforcement</topic><topic>Evaluation</topic><topic>Government regulation</topic><topic>Immunity</topic><topic>Industrial regulation</topic><topic>Law and legislation</topic><topic>Plaintiffs</topic><topic>Price regulation</topic><topic>Privileges and immunities</topic><topic>Regulated industries</topic><topic>Regulation</topic><topic>Securities and Exchange Commission regulation</topic><topic>Statutory law</topic><topic>Stock exchanges</topic><topic>Supreme Court decisions</topic><topic>U.S. states</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Shelanski, Howard A.</creatorcontrib><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><collection>Global News & ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>University Readers</collection><collection>Access via ABI/INFORM (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>SIRS Editorial</collection><jtitle>Michigan law review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Shelanski, Howard A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION</atitle><jtitle>Michigan law review</jtitle><date>2011-03-01</date><risdate>2011</risdate><volume>109</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>683</spage><epage>732</epage><pages>683-732</pages><issn>0026-2234</issn><eissn>1939-8557</eissn><abstract>The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit-Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end.</abstract><cop>Ann Arbor</cop><pub>Michigan Law Review Association</pub><tpages>50</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0026-2234 |
| ispartof | Michigan law review, 2011-03, Vol.109 (5), p.683-732 |
| issn | 0026-2234 1939-8557 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_gale_infotracgeneralonefile_A252739966 |
| source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals |
| subjects | Administrative agencies Antitrust Antitrust law Antitrust laws Commercial regulation Competition Cost control Court decisions and opinions Economic aspects Economic conditions Economic regulation Enforcement Evaluation Government regulation Immunity Industrial regulation Law and legislation Plaintiffs Price regulation Privileges and immunities Regulated industries Regulation Securities and Exchange Commission regulation Statutory law Stock exchanges Supreme Court decisions U.S. states |
| title | THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST AND REGULATION |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-26T14%3A43%3A47IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=THE%20CASE%20FOR%20REBALANCING%20ANTITRUST%20AND%20REGULATION&rft.jtitle=Michigan%20law%20review&rft.au=Shelanski,%20Howard%20A.&rft.date=2011-03-01&rft.volume=109&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=683&rft.epage=732&rft.pages=683-732&rft.issn=0026-2234&rft.eissn=1939-8557&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cgale_proqu%3EA252739966%3C/gale_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=859448322&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A252739966&rft_informt_id=10.3316/agispt.20191212021527&rft_jstor_id=25801852&rfr_iscdi=true |