Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law
Abstract Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting mechanism, insincere votingin the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests votingis perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that in...
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creator | Goshen, Zohar |
description | Abstract
Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting
mechanism, insincere votingin the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests votingis perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that insincere voting
distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems
frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally, this article claims
that although the two problems have seemingly different solutions, these solutions are essentially similar in nature: all solutions to insincere voting are variations on two basic
rules, namely, property rules and liability rules.
Recommended Citation
Goshen, Zohar
(2001)
"Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law,"
Theoretical Inquiries in Law:
Vol. 2
:
No.
2, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art9 |
doi_str_mv | 10.2202/1565-3404.1037 |
format | Article |
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Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting
mechanism, insincere votingin the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests votingis perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that insincere voting
distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems
frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally, this article claims
that although the two problems have seemingly different solutions, these solutions are essentially similar in nature: all solutions to insincere voting are variations on two basic
rules, namely, property rules and liability rules.
Recommended Citation
Goshen, Zohar
(2001)
"Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law,"
Theoretical Inquiries in Law:
Vol. 2
:
No.
2, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art9</description><identifier>ISSN: 1565-3404</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1565-1509</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1565-3404</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2202/1565-3404.1037</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>bepress</publisher><subject>Corporation law</subject><ispartof>Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2001-07, Vol.2 (2), p.9</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 2001 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-b2502-12cd116c4e5f74f32682bcc2166eeabb9ecaef6a734eb4c49b44ebe5066fe7a03</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27903,27904</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Goshen, Zohar</creatorcontrib><title>Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law</title><title>Theoretical Inquiries in Law</title><description>Abstract
Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting
mechanism, insincere votingin the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests votingis perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that insincere voting
distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems
frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally, this article claims
that although the two problems have seemingly different solutions, these solutions are essentially similar in nature: all solutions to insincere voting are variations on two basic
rules, namely, property rules and liability rules.
Recommended Citation
Goshen, Zohar
(2001)
"Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law,"
Theoretical Inquiries in Law:
Vol. 2
:
No.
2, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art9</description><subject>Corporation law</subject><issn>1565-3404</issn><issn>1565-1509</issn><issn>1565-3404</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2001</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kM1LAzEQxYMoWKtXj7Iggh625jvtsRSrxYII1WvIppMS3WZLslD737trpSoUmcMMj997DA-hc4J7lGJ6S4QUOeOY9whm6gB1dsLhr_sYnaT0hjERitMOunqtah8W2fUkJB8sRCg3N5kP2aiKqyqaGrKpWZ-iI2fKBGffu4texnez0UM-fbqfjIbTvKAC05xQOydEWg7CKe4YlX1aWEuJlACmKAZgDThpFONQcMsHBW8OEFhKB8pg1kWX29yFKUH74Ko6Grv0yeohwYpRhsmgofI91AICRFNWAZxv5D98bw_fzByW3v5nsLFKKYLTq-iXJm40wbrtWrd16rZO3Xb985FPNXzsaBPftVRMCf0841r2-5I-krGmDX-x5QtYRUhp56h9-RX4CROnhw8</recordid><startdate>20010701</startdate><enddate>20010701</enddate><creator>Goshen, Zohar</creator><general>bepress</general><general>De Gruyter</general><general>Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>ILT</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20010701</creationdate><title>Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law</title><author>Goshen, Zohar</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-b2502-12cd116c4e5f74f32682bcc2166eeabb9ecaef6a734eb4c49b44ebe5066fe7a03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2001</creationdate><topic>Corporation law</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Goshen, Zohar</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><jtitle>Theoretical Inquiries in Law</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Goshen, Zohar</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law</atitle><jtitle>Theoretical Inquiries in Law</jtitle><date>2001-07-01</date><risdate>2001</risdate><volume>2</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>9</spage><pages>9-</pages><issn>1565-3404</issn><issn>1565-1509</issn><eissn>1565-3404</eissn><abstract>Abstract
Voting lies at the center of collective decision-making in corporate law. While scholars have identified various problems with the voting
mechanism, insincere votingin the forms of strategic voting and conflict of interests votingis perhaps the most fundamental. This article shows that insincere voting
distorts the voting mechanism at its core, undermining its ability to determine transaction efficiency. As further demonstrated, strategic and conflict of interests problems
frequently coincide with one another: voting strategically often means being in conflict, and many fact patterns present aspects of both problems. Finally, this article claims
that although the two problems have seemingly different solutions, these solutions are essentially similar in nature: all solutions to insincere voting are variations on two basic
rules, namely, property rules and liability rules.
Recommended Citation
Goshen, Zohar
(2001)
"Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law,"
Theoretical Inquiries in Law:
Vol. 2
:
No.
2, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art9</abstract><pub>bepress</pub><doi>10.2202/1565-3404.1037</doi></addata></record> |
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language | eng |
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source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals; De Gruyter journals |
subjects | Corporation law |
title | Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law |
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