Why did inflation targeting fail in Argentina?
•Inflation targeting was implemented and failed in Argentina in 2016.•Inflation targeting suffered from implementation inconsistencies.•A negative credibility shock accelerated the loss of control of the inflation targeting regime. Argentina’s experience with inflation targeting started in 2016 and...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Quarterly review of economics and finance 2021-05, Vol.80, p.102-116 |
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| container_end_page | 116 |
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| container_title | The Quarterly review of economics and finance |
| container_volume | 80 |
| creator | Cachanosky, Nicolás Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián |
| description | •Inflation targeting was implemented and failed in Argentina in 2016.•Inflation targeting suffered from implementation inconsistencies.•A negative credibility shock accelerated the loss of control of the inflation targeting regime.
Argentina’s experience with inflation targeting started in 2016 and ended in 2018, lasting a total of only 25 months. In this paper, we study the reasons why this monetary regime failed in Argentina. We argue that the main reason for its failure was an internal inconsistency in how the central bank implemented inflation targeting, and a negative credibility shock accelerated that said inconsistency in December 2017. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.qref.2021.01.014 |
| format | Article |
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Argentina’s experience with inflation targeting started in 2016 and ended in 2018, lasting a total of only 25 months. In this paper, we study the reasons why this monetary regime failed in Argentina. We argue that the main reason for its failure was an internal inconsistency in how the central bank implemented inflation targeting, and a negative credibility shock accelerated that said inconsistency in December 2017.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1062-9769</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1878-4259</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2021.01.014</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Argentina ; Central bank credibility ; Expectations ; Inflation (Finance) ; Inflation targeting ; Shock</subject><ispartof>The Quarterly review of economics and finance, 2021-05, Vol.80, p.102-116</ispartof><rights>2021 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2021 Elsevier Advanced Technology Publications</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c396t-de2b590a57dad9c9a5dda2a8916d933f132af13edb7d5f719e4e2944edfda3393</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c396t-de2b590a57dad9c9a5dda2a8916d933f132af13edb7d5f719e4e2944edfda3393</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-9685-0899</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2021.01.014$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,3550,27924,27925,45995</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Cachanosky, Nicolás</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián</creatorcontrib><title>Why did inflation targeting fail in Argentina?</title><title>The Quarterly review of economics and finance</title><description>•Inflation targeting was implemented and failed in Argentina in 2016.•Inflation targeting suffered from implementation inconsistencies.•A negative credibility shock accelerated the loss of control of the inflation targeting regime.
Argentina’s experience with inflation targeting started in 2016 and ended in 2018, lasting a total of only 25 months. In this paper, we study the reasons why this monetary regime failed in Argentina. We argue that the main reason for its failure was an internal inconsistency in how the central bank implemented inflation targeting, and a negative credibility shock accelerated that said inconsistency in December 2017.</description><subject>Argentina</subject><subject>Central bank credibility</subject><subject>Expectations</subject><subject>Inflation (Finance)</subject><subject>Inflation targeting</subject><subject>Shock</subject><issn>1062-9769</issn><issn>1878-4259</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2021</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9UE1LxDAQDaLguvoHPPXkrTVfTTcgyLK4Kix4UTyG2WRas9RUmyjuvzdlPTs8ZoaZ9wbmEXLJaMUoU9e76nPEtuKUs4pOkEdkxhbNopS81se5p4qXulH6lJzFuKM5hJQzUr2-7QvnXeFD20PyQygSjB0mH7qiBd_nRbHMg5AncHtOTlroI1781Tl5Wd89rx7KzdP942q5Ka3QKpUO-bbWFOrGgdNWQ-0ccFhoppwWomWCQ07oto2r24ZplMi1lOhaB0JoMSdXh7sd9Gh8sENI-JM6-IrRmKVSggsqKMtEfiDacYgxe2A-Rv8O494waiZrzM5M1pjJGkMnyCy6OYgwv_DtcTTRegwWnR_RJuMG_5_8F7y4bAc</recordid><startdate>20210501</startdate><enddate>20210501</enddate><creator>Cachanosky, Nicolás</creator><creator>Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier Advanced Technology Publications</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9685-0899</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20210501</creationdate><title>Why did inflation targeting fail in Argentina?</title><author>Cachanosky, Nicolás ; Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c396t-de2b590a57dad9c9a5dda2a8916d933f132af13edb7d5f719e4e2944edfda3393</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2021</creationdate><topic>Argentina</topic><topic>Central bank credibility</topic><topic>Expectations</topic><topic>Inflation (Finance)</topic><topic>Inflation targeting</topic><topic>Shock</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Cachanosky, Nicolás</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>The Quarterly review of economics and finance</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Cachanosky, Nicolás</au><au>Ferrelli Mazza, Federico Julián</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Why did inflation targeting fail in Argentina?</atitle><jtitle>The Quarterly review of economics and finance</jtitle><date>2021-05-01</date><risdate>2021</risdate><volume>80</volume><spage>102</spage><epage>116</epage><pages>102-116</pages><issn>1062-9769</issn><eissn>1878-4259</eissn><abstract>•Inflation targeting was implemented and failed in Argentina in 2016.•Inflation targeting suffered from implementation inconsistencies.•A negative credibility shock accelerated the loss of control of the inflation targeting regime.
Argentina’s experience with inflation targeting started in 2016 and ended in 2018, lasting a total of only 25 months. In this paper, we study the reasons why this monetary regime failed in Argentina. We argue that the main reason for its failure was an internal inconsistency in how the central bank implemented inflation targeting, and a negative credibility shock accelerated that said inconsistency in December 2017.</abstract><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.qref.2021.01.014</doi><tpages>15</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9685-0899</orcidid></addata></record> |
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| ispartof | The Quarterly review of economics and finance, 2021-05, Vol.80, p.102-116 |
| issn | 1062-9769 1878-4259 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_gale_incontextgauss__A663230301 |
| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Argentina Central bank credibility Expectations Inflation (Finance) Inflation targeting Shock |
| title | Why did inflation targeting fail in Argentina? |
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