Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment
We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters’ turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 2020-10, Vol.110 (10), p.3298-3314 |
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| container_issue | 10 |
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| container_title | The American economic review |
| container_volume | 110 |
| creator | Levine, David K. Mattozzi, Andrea |
| description | We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters’ turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/aer.20170476 |
| format | Article |
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Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.</abstract><pub>American Economic Association</pub><doi>10.1257/aer.20170476</doi><tpages>17</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 2020-10, Vol.110 (10), p.3298-3314 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_gale_incontextgauss__A655860370 |
| source | EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Ethical aspects Laws, regulations and rules Observations Peer groups Political activity Political aspects Political parties Punishment Social norms United States Voter turnout |
| title | Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment |
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