CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D
We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. The results indicate that firms with confident chief executive officers (CEOs) are 24% more likely to report their research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to firms with...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Management science 2018-12, Vol.64 (12), p.5725-5747 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 5747 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 12 |
| container_start_page | 5725 |
| container_title | Management science |
| container_volume | 64 |
| creator | Koh, Ping-Sheng Reeb, David M. Zhao, Wanli |
| description | We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. The results indicate that firms with confident chief executive officers (CEOs) are 24% more likely to report their research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to firms with cautious CEOs. Exploiting staggered, state-level regulatory shocks and changes in CEO type, we find substantial evidence that cautious CEO firms fail to report R&D expenditures. After a plausibly exogenous shock to managerial reporting liability, cautious CEO firms exhibit a 35% larger reduction in unreported R&D relative to confident CEO firms. Interestingly, confident CEO firms do not exhibit more innovation than their cautious CEO counterparts after taking into account their differing propensities to report corporate R&D. Overall, our analysis suggests that the precision or reliability of mandatory disclosures systematically varies with managerial characteristics.
The Internet appendix is available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809
.
This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>gale_jstor</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_gale_incontextgauss__A573241587</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><galeid>A573241587</galeid><jstor_id>48748376</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>A573241587</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c565t-881eb6f65ca503094e866ec932ca9a13185f1104f958878588ac9d059cf356f83</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkV1LwzAUhoMoOKe33gkTYVd2JmnzdSl1fsBgIO46ZOnJ7FjTmXSg_96WiXMwkMAJhOc5J8mL0CXBI0KluKt8tCOKiRhRidUR6hFGecIYJseohzFlCVFYnaKzGJcYYyEF76HrfDwd5LV3ZQHewsD4YjDzAdZ1aKAYvA4fztGJM6sIFz97H80ex2_5czKZPr3k95PEMs6aREoCc-44s4bhFKsMJOdgVUqtUYakRDJHCM6cYlIK2RZjVYGZsi5l3Mm0j262fdeh_thAbPSy3gTfjtS0lSUjmIodtTAr0KV3dROMrcpo9T0TKc0Ikx2VHKAW4CGYVe3Ble3xHj86wLergKq0B4XhntAyDXw2C7OJUe-Dt3_A-SaWHmJbYrl4b-KWP3QRG-oYAzi9DmVlwpcmWHcp6y5l3aWsu5Rb4WorLGNTh186kyKTqeC7n-geFar4X79v9CasYw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2185851027</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D</title><source>Jstor Complete Legacy</source><source>INFORMS PubsOnLine</source><source>Business Source Complete</source><creator>Koh, Ping-Sheng ; Reeb, David M. ; Zhao, Wanli</creator><creatorcontrib>Koh, Ping-Sheng ; Reeb, David M. ; Zhao, Wanli</creatorcontrib><description>We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. The results indicate that firms with confident chief executive officers (CEOs) are 24% more likely to report their research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to firms with cautious CEOs. Exploiting staggered, state-level regulatory shocks and changes in CEO type, we find substantial evidence that cautious CEO firms fail to report R&D expenditures. After a plausibly exogenous shock to managerial reporting liability, cautious CEO firms exhibit a 35% larger reduction in unreported R&D relative to confident CEO firms. Interestingly, confident CEO firms do not exhibit more innovation than their cautious CEO counterparts after taking into account their differing propensities to report corporate R&D. Overall, our analysis suggests that the precision or reliability of mandatory disclosures systematically varies with managerial characteristics.
The Internet appendix is available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809
.
This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0025-1909</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1526-5501</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Linthicum: INFORMS</publisher><subject>Accounting and auditing ; Behavior ; Chief executive officers ; Chief executives ; Companies ; corporate opacity ; Decision making ; Disclosure ; Evaluation ; Executive ability ; Finance ; Financial disclosure ; Industrial research ; Influence ; innovation ; Innovations ; Laws, regulations and rules ; Liability ; Management ; mandatory disclosure ; missing R&D ; overconfident CEOs ; R&D ; Reliability ; Research & development ; Research & development expenditures ; United States</subject><ispartof>Management science, 2018-12, Vol.64 (12), p.5725-5747</ispartof><rights>2017 INFORMS</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2018 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</rights><rights>Copyright Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences Dec 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c565t-881eb6f65ca503094e866ec932ca9a13185f1104f958878588ac9d059cf356f83</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c565t-881eb6f65ca503094e866ec932ca9a13185f1104f958878588ac9d059cf356f83</cites><orcidid>0000-0001-8600-4720 ; 0000-0001-6228-1918 ; 0000-0001-9983-6139</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48748376$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/full/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginforms$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,3679,27903,27904,57995,58228,62592</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Koh, Ping-Sheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Reeb, David M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Wanli</creatorcontrib><title>CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D</title><title>Management science</title><description>We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. The results indicate that firms with confident chief executive officers (CEOs) are 24% more likely to report their research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to firms with cautious CEOs. Exploiting staggered, state-level regulatory shocks and changes in CEO type, we find substantial evidence that cautious CEO firms fail to report R&D expenditures. After a plausibly exogenous shock to managerial reporting liability, cautious CEO firms exhibit a 35% larger reduction in unreported R&D relative to confident CEO firms. Interestingly, confident CEO firms do not exhibit more innovation than their cautious CEO counterparts after taking into account their differing propensities to report corporate R&D. Overall, our analysis suggests that the precision or reliability of mandatory disclosures systematically varies with managerial characteristics.
The Internet appendix is available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809
.
This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.</description><subject>Accounting and auditing</subject><subject>Behavior</subject><subject>Chief executive officers</subject><subject>Chief executives</subject><subject>Companies</subject><subject>corporate opacity</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Disclosure</subject><subject>Evaluation</subject><subject>Executive ability</subject><subject>Finance</subject><subject>Financial disclosure</subject><subject>Industrial research</subject><subject>Influence</subject><subject>innovation</subject><subject>Innovations</subject><subject>Laws, regulations and rules</subject><subject>Liability</subject><subject>Management</subject><subject>mandatory disclosure</subject><subject>missing R&D</subject><subject>overconfident CEOs</subject><subject>R&D</subject><subject>Reliability</subject><subject>Research & development</subject><subject>Research & development expenditures</subject><subject>United States</subject><issn>0025-1909</issn><issn>1526-5501</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>N95</sourceid><recordid>eNqFkV1LwzAUhoMoOKe33gkTYVd2JmnzdSl1fsBgIO46ZOnJ7FjTmXSg_96WiXMwkMAJhOc5J8mL0CXBI0KluKt8tCOKiRhRidUR6hFGecIYJseohzFlCVFYnaKzGJcYYyEF76HrfDwd5LV3ZQHewsD4YjDzAdZ1aKAYvA4fztGJM6sIFz97H80ex2_5czKZPr3k95PEMs6aREoCc-44s4bhFKsMJOdgVUqtUYakRDJHCM6cYlIK2RZjVYGZsi5l3Mm0j262fdeh_thAbPSy3gTfjtS0lSUjmIodtTAr0KV3dROMrcpo9T0TKc0Ikx2VHKAW4CGYVe3Ble3xHj86wLergKq0B4XhntAyDXw2C7OJUe-Dt3_A-SaWHmJbYrl4b-KWP3QRG-oYAzi9DmVlwpcmWHcp6y5l3aWsu5Rb4WorLGNTh186kyKTqeC7n-geFar4X79v9CasYw</recordid><startdate>20181201</startdate><enddate>20181201</enddate><creator>Koh, Ping-Sheng</creator><creator>Reeb, David M.</creator><creator>Zhao, Wanli</creator><general>INFORMS</general><general>Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>N95</scope><scope>XI7</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8600-4720</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6228-1918</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9983-6139</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20181201</creationdate><title>CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D</title><author>Koh, Ping-Sheng ; Reeb, David M. ; Zhao, Wanli</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c565t-881eb6f65ca503094e866ec932ca9a13185f1104f958878588ac9d059cf356f83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Accounting and auditing</topic><topic>Behavior</topic><topic>Chief executive officers</topic><topic>Chief executives</topic><topic>Companies</topic><topic>corporate opacity</topic><topic>Decision making</topic><topic>Disclosure</topic><topic>Evaluation</topic><topic>Executive ability</topic><topic>Finance</topic><topic>Financial disclosure</topic><topic>Industrial research</topic><topic>Influence</topic><topic>innovation</topic><topic>Innovations</topic><topic>Laws, regulations and rules</topic><topic>Liability</topic><topic>Management</topic><topic>mandatory disclosure</topic><topic>missing R&D</topic><topic>overconfident CEOs</topic><topic>R&D</topic><topic>Reliability</topic><topic>Research & development</topic><topic>Research & development expenditures</topic><topic>United States</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Koh, Ping-Sheng</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Reeb, David M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zhao, Wanli</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Gale Business: Insights</collection><collection>Business Insights: Essentials</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Management science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Koh, Ping-Sheng</au><au>Reeb, David M.</au><au>Zhao, Wanli</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D</atitle><jtitle>Management science</jtitle><date>2018-12-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>64</volume><issue>12</issue><spage>5725</spage><epage>5747</epage><pages>5725-5747</pages><issn>0025-1909</issn><eissn>1526-5501</eissn><abstract>We investigate whether managerial traits influence corporate decisions to provide mandatory financial disclosures. The results indicate that firms with confident chief executive officers (CEOs) are 24% more likely to report their research and development (R&D) expenditures relative to firms with cautious CEOs. Exploiting staggered, state-level regulatory shocks and changes in CEO type, we find substantial evidence that cautious CEO firms fail to report R&D expenditures. After a plausibly exogenous shock to managerial reporting liability, cautious CEO firms exhibit a 35% larger reduction in unreported R&D relative to confident CEO firms. Interestingly, confident CEO firms do not exhibit more innovation than their cautious CEO counterparts after taking into account their differing propensities to report corporate R&D. Overall, our analysis suggests that the precision or reliability of mandatory disclosures systematically varies with managerial characteristics.
The Internet appendix is available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809
.
This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.</abstract><cop>Linthicum</cop><pub>INFORMS</pub><doi>10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809</doi><tpages>23</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8600-4720</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6228-1918</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9983-6139</orcidid></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0025-1909 |
| ispartof | Management science, 2018-12, Vol.64 (12), p.5725-5747 |
| issn | 0025-1909 1526-5501 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_gale_incontextgauss__A573241587 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; INFORMS PubsOnLine; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Accounting and auditing Behavior Chief executive officers Chief executives Companies corporate opacity Decision making Disclosure Evaluation Executive ability Finance Financial disclosure Industrial research Influence innovation Innovations Laws, regulations and rules Liability Management mandatory disclosure missing R&D overconfident CEOs R&D Reliability Research & development Research & development expenditures United States |
| title | CEO Confidence and Unreported R&D |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-28T03%3A34%3A20IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-gale_jstor&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=CEO%20Confidence%20and%20Unreported%20R&D&rft.jtitle=Management%20science&rft.au=Koh,%20Ping-Sheng&rft.date=2018-12-01&rft.volume=64&rft.issue=12&rft.spage=5725&rft.epage=5747&rft.pages=5725-5747&rft.issn=0025-1909&rft.eissn=1526-5501&rft_id=info:doi/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2809&rft_dat=%3Cgale_jstor%3EA573241587%3C/gale_jstor%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2185851027&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_galeid=A573241587&rft_jstor_id=48748376&rfr_iscdi=true |