The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data
The Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Management science 2010-12, Vol.56 (12), p.2123-2133 |
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| creator | Luchs, Ryan Geylani, Tansev Dukes, Anthony Srinivasan, Kannan |
| description | The Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006-2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1244 |
| format | Article |
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The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0025-1909</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1526-5501</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1244</identifier><identifier>CODEN: MSCIAM</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Hanover, MD: INFORMS</publisher><subject>Anti-trust legislation ; Antitrust ; Antitrust law ; Antitrust laws ; Applied sciences ; case history ; Case studies ; channels of distribution ; Competition ; Competition law ; Consumer goods industries ; Defendants ; Discounts ; Distribution ; Distribution channels ; Economic competition ; Economics ; Exact sciences and technology ; Fines & penalties ; Firm modelling ; General aspects ; Inventory control, production control. Distribution ; Legal protection ; Legal research ; Legislation ; Liability ; Management science ; Market prices ; Marketing ; Operational research and scientific management ; Operational research. Management science ; Packaged goods ; Plaintiffs ; Price discrimination ; Price formation ; Prices ; Prices and rates ; pricing ; Pricing policies ; Retail stores ; Robinson Patman Act 1936-US ; Robinson-Patman Act ; Small and medium sized enterprises ; Small business ; Studies ; Success ; Supreme Court ; Supreme Court decisions ; Tobacco industry ; Trends ; Truck industry ; U.S.A ; Wholesale industry</subject><ispartof>Management science, 2010-12, Vol.56 (12), p.2123-2133</ispartof><rights>2010 INFORMS</rights><rights>2015 INIST-CNRS</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2010 Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences</rights><rights>Copyright Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences Dec 2010</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c654t-2fcd1c3ae16af94136d7078b5f9139f64d3502c10e1e234ba0c9b482b435ad4e3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c654t-2fcd1c3ae16af94136d7078b5f9139f64d3502c10e1e234ba0c9b482b435ad4e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40959625$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/full/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1244$$EHTML$$P50$$Ginforms$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,3692,4008,27924,27925,58017,58250,62616</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=23618820$$DView record in Pascal Francis$$Hfree_for_read</backlink><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/inmormnsc/v_3a56_3ay_3a2010_3ai_3a12_3ap_3a2123-2133.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Luchs, Ryan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Geylani, Tansev</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dukes, Anthony</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Srinivasan, Kannan</creatorcontrib><title>The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data</title><title>Management science</title><description>The Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006-2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.</description><subject>Anti-trust legislation</subject><subject>Antitrust</subject><subject>Antitrust law</subject><subject>Antitrust laws</subject><subject>Applied sciences</subject><subject>case history</subject><subject>Case studies</subject><subject>channels of distribution</subject><subject>Competition</subject><subject>Competition law</subject><subject>Consumer goods industries</subject><subject>Defendants</subject><subject>Discounts</subject><subject>Distribution</subject><subject>Distribution channels</subject><subject>Economic competition</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Exact sciences and technology</subject><subject>Fines & penalties</subject><subject>Firm modelling</subject><subject>General aspects</subject><subject>Inventory control, production control. 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| source | RePEc; INFORMS PubsOnLine; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Anti-trust legislation Antitrust Antitrust law Antitrust laws Applied sciences case history Case studies channels of distribution Competition Competition law Consumer goods industries Defendants Discounts Distribution Distribution channels Economic competition Economics Exact sciences and technology Fines & penalties Firm modelling General aspects Inventory control, production control. Distribution Legal protection Legal research Legislation Liability Management science Market prices Marketing Operational research and scientific management Operational research. Management science Packaged goods Plaintiffs Price discrimination Price formation Prices Prices and rates pricing Pricing policies Retail stores Robinson Patman Act 1936-US Robinson-Patman Act Small and medium sized enterprises Small business Studies Success Supreme Court Supreme Court decisions Tobacco industry Trends Truck industry U.S.A Wholesale industry |
| title | The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data |
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