Optimal pricing model of car-sharing: market pricing or platform pricing

PurposeThe car-sharing market has entered the mature stage, and consumers' demand shows a diversified increasing trend. This paper considers two modes of operation and two pricing strategies, which are business-to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer modes, market pricing and platform pricing. Und...

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Veröffentlicht in:Industrial management + data systems 2021-03, Vol.121 (3), p.594-612
Hauptverfasser: Liang, Ling, Tian, Lin, Xie, Jiaping, Xu, Jianhong, Zhang, Weisi
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container_end_page 612
container_issue 3
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creator Liang, Ling
Tian, Lin
Xie, Jiaping
Xu, Jianhong
Zhang, Weisi
description PurposeThe car-sharing market has entered the mature stage, and consumers' demand shows a diversified increasing trend. This paper considers two modes of operation and two pricing strategies, which are business-to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer modes, market pricing and platform pricing. Under these conditions, the platform's revenue-sharing ratio will be different. The purpose of this paper is to explore this research question, and seeks an optimal pricing mechanism that can achieve a win–win situation between platform and automobile manufacturer in the two market modes.Design/methodology/approachThe authors design different profit functions for platform under the two contexts. Of course, the platform's function is constrained to the manufacturer's function. By introducing a revenue-sharing contract a Stackelberg game model dominated by the platform is established and the equilibrium solutions under the two pricing models are derived.FindingsThe study found that even if only market pricing is executed, the scale of the car-sharing market will continue to expand. As the car-sharing market becomes more saturated, platform pricing is better for the automobile manufacturer; in most cases, the platform prefers platform pricing, but when the number of private cars is relatively small, if the cost of car operation and maintenance for the automobile manufacturer is lower or the revenue-sharing ratio of private cars is high, then market pricing will be more favorable to the platform.Practical implicationsWith the cross-border integration of car service platforms and the automobile manufacturing industry, the key to achieving win–win cooperation and sustainable development in the car-sharing market will converge on the question of how to design a suitable pricing mechanism and revenue-sharing method.Originality/valueAuthors have determined how a car-sharing platform achieves a win–win order pricing strategy with the manufacturer and private car owners, respectively. And authors combined the supply chain revenue-sharing contract with the car-sharing market to explore the application of the revenue-sharing contract in the sharing economy.
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source Emerald Journals
subjects Automobiles
Business models
Car sharing
Consumers
Cooperation
Coronaviruses
COVID-19
Game theory
Manufacturers
Pandemics
Pricing
Profits
Questions
Rentals
Revenue
Revenue sharing
Sharing economy
Supply & demand
Supply chains
Sustainable development
Traffic congestion
title Optimal pricing model of car-sharing: market pricing or platform pricing
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