North Korea's Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime
The 2010 Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong-do artillery bombardment were indications of how difficult it is to deter low-level North Korean provocations. These incidents elicited U.S.-ROK reaffirmation of their strategic deterrence commitment as well as a ROK declaratory policy shift toward proactive d...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Report |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | The 2010 Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong-do artillery bombardment were indications of how difficult it is to deter low-level North Korean provocations. These incidents elicited U.S.-ROK reaffirmation of their strategic deterrence commitment as well as a ROK declaratory policy shift toward proactive deterrence and manifold retaliation. Despite these reactions, strengthening deterrence of low-level provocations while minimizing risks of potential rapid conflict escalation remains a central dilemma as was demonstrated in the reaction to North Korea s alleged hack of Sony in order to prevent the release of the movie The Interview. This paper, which builds from an earlier paper written on covert versus overt provocations for the 6th CNA-KIMS workshop, examines North Korea s provocation and escalation calculus, as well as the timing inherent in its brinksmanship decision-making. It contains information up through the end of May 2015. |
---|