Profiler-2000: Attacking the Insider Threat
The Profiler project was concerned with fundamental theoretical and measurement issues in the field of anomaly/intrusion detection, particularly as directed at the problem of insiders. Major issues addressed were: scientifically sound foundations for divers anomaly detectors; tools and methods for a...
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| creator | Maxion, R A Tan, K M Killourhy, S S Townsend, T N |
| description | The Profiler project was concerned with fundamental theoretical and measurement issues in the field of anomaly/intrusion detection, particularly as directed at the problem of insiders. Major issues addressed were: scientifically sound foundations for divers anomaly detectors; tools and methods for assessment of detector effectiveness; and controlled benchmark data sets for testing. Major accomplishments of the project were: determining how the interaction between the architectural aspects of a detection algorithm, such as detection mechanism and coverage, can result in unanticipated vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to undermine the detector; production of calibrated test data sets; and rigorous assessment and error analysis of an anomaly detector in an insider-threat environment.
The original document contains color images. |
| format | Report |
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The original document contains color images.</description><language>eng</language><subject>ADVERSARIES ; ALGORITHMS ; ANOMALIES ; ANOMALY DETECTION ; BENCHMARKS ; CALIBRATION ; COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE ; Computer Systems Management and Standards ; DATA BASES ; DATA PROCESSING SECURITY ; DETECTION ALGORITHMS ; ERROR ANALYSIS ; EXPERIMENTAL DATA ; INSIDER THREATS ; INTRUSION DETECTION ; INTRUSION DETECTORS ; Miscellaneous Detection and Detectors ; PE62301E ; PROFILER PROJECT ; PROFILING ; THREATS ; WUAFRLIAST0006</subject><creationdate>2005</creationdate><rights>Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This document is not available from DTIC in microfiche.</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,776,881,27544,27545</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA439600$$EView_record_in_DTIC$$FView_record_in_$$GDTIC$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Maxion, R A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tan, K M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Killourhy, S S</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Townsend, T N</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA</creatorcontrib><title>Profiler-2000: Attacking the Insider Threat</title><description>The Profiler project was concerned with fundamental theoretical and measurement issues in the field of anomaly/intrusion detection, particularly as directed at the problem of insiders. Major issues addressed were: scientifically sound foundations for divers anomaly detectors; tools and methods for assessment of detector effectiveness; and controlled benchmark data sets for testing. Major accomplishments of the project were: determining how the interaction between the architectural aspects of a detection algorithm, such as detection mechanism and coverage, can result in unanticipated vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to undermine the detector; production of calibrated test data sets; and rigorous assessment and error analysis of an anomaly detector in an insider-threat environment.
The original document contains color images.</description><subject>ADVERSARIES</subject><subject>ALGORITHMS</subject><subject>ANOMALIES</subject><subject>ANOMALY DETECTION</subject><subject>BENCHMARKS</subject><subject>CALIBRATION</subject><subject>COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE</subject><subject>Computer Systems Management and Standards</subject><subject>DATA BASES</subject><subject>DATA PROCESSING SECURITY</subject><subject>DETECTION ALGORITHMS</subject><subject>ERROR ANALYSIS</subject><subject>EXPERIMENTAL DATA</subject><subject>INSIDER THREATS</subject><subject>INTRUSION DETECTION</subject><subject>INTRUSION DETECTORS</subject><subject>Miscellaneous Detection and Detectors</subject><subject>PE62301E</subject><subject>PROFILER PROJECT</subject><subject>PROFILING</subject><subject>THREATS</subject><subject>WUAFRLIAST0006</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>report</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>report</recordtype><sourceid>1RU</sourceid><recordid>eNrjZNAOKMpPy8xJLdI1MjAwsFJwLClJTM7OzEtXKMlIVfDMK85MSS1SCMkoSk0s4WFgTUvMKU7lhdLcDDJuriHOHropJZnJ8cUlmXmpJfGOLo4mxpZmBgbGBKQBOfAlMw</recordid><startdate>200509</startdate><enddate>200509</enddate><creator>Maxion, R A</creator><creator>Tan, K M</creator><creator>Killourhy, S S</creator><creator>Townsend, T N</creator><scope>1RU</scope><scope>BHM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>200509</creationdate><title>Profiler-2000: Attacking the Insider Threat</title><author>Maxion, R A ; Tan, K M ; Killourhy, S S ; Townsend, T N</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-dtic_stinet_ADA4396003</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>reports</rsrctype><prefilter>reports</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>ADVERSARIES</topic><topic>ALGORITHMS</topic><topic>ANOMALIES</topic><topic>ANOMALY DETECTION</topic><topic>BENCHMARKS</topic><topic>CALIBRATION</topic><topic>COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE</topic><topic>Computer Systems Management and Standards</topic><topic>DATA BASES</topic><topic>DATA PROCESSING SECURITY</topic><topic>DETECTION ALGORITHMS</topic><topic>ERROR ANALYSIS</topic><topic>EXPERIMENTAL DATA</topic><topic>INSIDER THREATS</topic><topic>INTRUSION DETECTION</topic><topic>INTRUSION DETECTORS</topic><topic>Miscellaneous Detection and Detectors</topic><topic>PE62301E</topic><topic>PROFILER PROJECT</topic><topic>PROFILING</topic><topic>THREATS</topic><topic>WUAFRLIAST0006</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Maxion, R A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tan, K M</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Killourhy, S S</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Townsend, T N</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA</creatorcontrib><collection>DTIC Technical Reports</collection><collection>DTIC STINET</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Maxion, R A</au><au>Tan, K M</au><au>Killourhy, S S</au><au>Townsend, T N</au><aucorp>CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA</aucorp><format>book</format><genre>unknown</genre><ristype>RPRT</ristype><btitle>Profiler-2000: Attacking the Insider Threat</btitle><date>2005-09</date><risdate>2005</risdate><abstract>The Profiler project was concerned with fundamental theoretical and measurement issues in the field of anomaly/intrusion detection, particularly as directed at the problem of insiders. Major issues addressed were: scientifically sound foundations for divers anomaly detectors; tools and methods for assessment of detector effectiveness; and controlled benchmark data sets for testing. Major accomplishments of the project were: determining how the interaction between the architectural aspects of a detection algorithm, such as detection mechanism and coverage, can result in unanticipated vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to undermine the detector; production of calibrated test data sets; and rigorous assessment and error analysis of an anomaly detector in an insider-threat environment.
The original document contains color images.</abstract><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| source | DTIC Technical Reports |
| subjects | ADVERSARIES ALGORITHMS ANOMALIES ANOMALY DETECTION BENCHMARKS CALIBRATION COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE Computer Systems Management and Standards DATA BASES DATA PROCESSING SECURITY DETECTION ALGORITHMS ERROR ANALYSIS EXPERIMENTAL DATA INSIDER THREATS INTRUSION DETECTION INTRUSION DETECTORS Miscellaneous Detection and Detectors PE62301E PROFILER PROJECT PROFILING THREATS WUAFRLIAST0006 |
| title | Profiler-2000: Attacking the Insider Threat |
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