Self-Inflicted Wound Allied Defeat in Crete, May 1941

Early in World War II Great Britain and Germany both identified the strategic importance of the island of Crete for conducting military operations in the Mediterranean. The Allies began defending Crete in November 1940 but only committed limited resources and personnel until allied intelligence unco...

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description Early in World War II Great Britain and Germany both identified the strategic importance of the island of Crete for conducting military operations in the Mediterranean. The Allies began defending Crete in November 1940 but only committed limited resources and personnel until allied intelligence uncovered the details of the German invasion plan for Crete, Operation MERCURY. In a last ditch effort, Allied forces evacuated from Greece were sent to Crete bringing the number of defenders to 42,500 to repel an inaccurately estimated enemy assault of 5,000 men. Operation MERCURY called for gliders and paratroops to conduct the largest airborne operation to data. The plan pitted 22,000 men and 1280 aircraft against an erroneously estimated enemy strength of 5,000 men. The defenders outnumbered the attackers nearly 2 to 1, knew the invasion plan, and established their defense accordingly. By all accounts, the Allies should have defeated the Germans and in fact came quite close to doing so. However, failures in Allied leadership afforded the Germans opportunities that they quickly exploited. subsequently, they were able to defeat the Allies within 12 days. Failure in allied leadership, not overwhelming German combat power, was responsible for the Allied defeat on Crete. The original document contains color images
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The Allies began defending Crete in November 1940 but only committed limited resources and personnel until allied intelligence uncovered the details of the German invasion plan for Crete, Operation MERCURY. In a last ditch effort, Allied forces evacuated from Greece were sent to Crete bringing the number of defenders to 42,500 to repel an inaccurately estimated enemy assault of 5,000 men. Operation MERCURY called for gliders and paratroops to conduct the largest airborne operation to data. The plan pitted 22,000 men and 1280 aircraft against an erroneously estimated enemy strength of 5,000 men. The defenders outnumbered the attackers nearly 2 to 1, knew the invasion plan, and established their defense accordingly. By all accounts, the Allies should have defeated the Germans and in fact came quite close to doing so. However, failures in Allied leadership afforded the Germans opportunities that they quickly exploited. subsequently, they were able to defeat the Allies within 12 days. 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Failure in allied leadership, not overwhelming German combat power, was responsible for the Allied defeat on Crete. 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source DTIC Technical Reports
subjects AERIAL WARFARE
CRETE ISLAND
EUROPE
GERMANY
LEADERSHIP
Military Forces and Organizations
MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN)
MILITARY HISTORY
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
MILITARY STRATEGY
SECOND WORLD WAR
THESES
title Self-Inflicted Wound Allied Defeat in Crete, May 1941
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