The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II
This study focuses on doctrine of the U.S. Army's mechanized cavalry during World War II. The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II bat...
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creator | DiMarco, Louis A |
description | This study focuses on doctrine of the U.S. Army's mechanized cavalry during World War II. The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II battlefield. Combat experience revealed that cavalry missions were not limited to reconnaissance, which constituted the main mission under mechanized cavalry doctrine, but included the complete range of traditional horse cavalry missions as well. Combat further revealed that cavalry had to fight to gain information. Although doctrine was adjusted during the war, the published tactical and operational concepts never caught up with the reality of the battlefield. The campaign in Northwest Europe confirmed many of the lessons learned in North Africa, and revealed the importance of the corps cavalry groups to corps level maneuver. The published mechanized cavalry doctrine of World War II did not meet the needs of the battlefield, yet the cavalry's combat record in World War II was impressive. This record of success, and the reasons for it, are still relevant to modern armored cavalry as well as to future Force XXI Army designs and concepts. |
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The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II battlefield. Combat experience revealed that cavalry missions were not limited to reconnaissance, which constituted the main mission under mechanized cavalry doctrine, but included the complete range of traditional horse cavalry missions as well. Combat further revealed that cavalry had to fight to gain information. Although doctrine was adjusted during the war, the published tactical and operational concepts never caught up with the reality of the battlefield. The campaign in Northwest Europe confirmed many of the lessons learned in North Africa, and revealed the importance of the corps cavalry groups to corps level maneuver. The published mechanized cavalry doctrine of World War II did not meet the needs of the battlefield, yet the cavalry's combat record in World War II was impressive. This record of success, and the reasons for it, are still relevant to modern armored cavalry as well as to future Force XXI Army designs and concepts.</description><language>eng</language><subject>ARMORED VEHICLES ; ARMY ; BATTLEFIELDS ; CAVALRY ; CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS ; GLOBAL ; HORSES ; LESSONS LEARNED ; MANEUVERS ; MECHANIZATION ; MILITARY DOCTRINE ; Military Forces and Organizations ; MILITARY HISTORY ; MILITARY TACTICS ; MISSIONS ; NORTH AFRICA ; RECONNAISSANCE ; WARFARE ; WORLD WAR 2</subject><creationdate>1995</creationdate><rights>APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>230,780,885,27567,27568</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA299016$$EView_record_in_DTIC$$FView_record_in_$$GDTIC$$Hfree_for_read</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>DiMarco, Louis A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS</creatorcontrib><title>The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II</title><description>This study focuses on doctrine of the U.S. Army's mechanized cavalry during World War II. The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II battlefield. Combat experience revealed that cavalry missions were not limited to reconnaissance, which constituted the main mission under mechanized cavalry doctrine, but included the complete range of traditional horse cavalry missions as well. Combat further revealed that cavalry had to fight to gain information. Although doctrine was adjusted during the war, the published tactical and operational concepts never caught up with the reality of the battlefield. The campaign in Northwest Europe confirmed many of the lessons learned in North Africa, and revealed the importance of the corps cavalry groups to corps level maneuver. The published mechanized cavalry doctrine of World War II did not meet the needs of the battlefield, yet the cavalry's combat record in World War II was impressive. This record of success, and the reasons for it, are still relevant to modern armored cavalry as well as to future Force XXI Army designs and concepts.</description><subject>ARMORED VEHICLES</subject><subject>ARMY</subject><subject>BATTLEFIELDS</subject><subject>CAVALRY</subject><subject>CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS</subject><subject>GLOBAL</subject><subject>HORSES</subject><subject>LESSONS LEARNED</subject><subject>MANEUVERS</subject><subject>MECHANIZATION</subject><subject>MILITARY DOCTRINE</subject><subject>Military Forces and Organizations</subject><subject>MILITARY HISTORY</subject><subject>MILITARY TACTICS</subject><subject>MISSIONS</subject><subject>NORTH AFRICA</subject><subject>RECONNAISSANCE</subject><subject>WARFARE</subject><subject>WORLD WAR 2</subject><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>report</rsrctype><creationdate>1995</creationdate><recordtype>report</recordtype><sourceid>1RU</sourceid><recordid>eNrjZLAOyUhVCNUL1lNwLMqtVC9W8E1NzkjMy6xKTVFwTixLzCmqVHDJTy4pysxLVcjMUwjPL8pJUQhPLFLw9ORhYE1LzClO5YXS3Awybq4hzh66KSWZyfHFJUAtJfGOLo5GlpYGhmbGBKQB5bUqaQ</recordid><startdate>19950602</startdate><enddate>19950602</enddate><creator>DiMarco, Louis A</creator><scope>1RU</scope><scope>BHM</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19950602</creationdate><title>The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II</title><author>DiMarco, Louis A</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-dtic_stinet_ADA2990163</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>reports</rsrctype><prefilter>reports</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1995</creationdate><topic>ARMORED VEHICLES</topic><topic>ARMY</topic><topic>BATTLEFIELDS</topic><topic>CAVALRY</topic><topic>CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS</topic><topic>GLOBAL</topic><topic>HORSES</topic><topic>LESSONS LEARNED</topic><topic>MANEUVERS</topic><topic>MECHANIZATION</topic><topic>MILITARY DOCTRINE</topic><topic>Military Forces and Organizations</topic><topic>MILITARY HISTORY</topic><topic>MILITARY TACTICS</topic><topic>MISSIONS</topic><topic>NORTH AFRICA</topic><topic>RECONNAISSANCE</topic><topic>WARFARE</topic><topic>WORLD WAR 2</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>DiMarco, Louis A</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS</creatorcontrib><collection>DTIC Technical Reports</collection><collection>DTIC STINET</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>DiMarco, Louis A</au><aucorp>ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS</aucorp><format>book</format><genre>unknown</genre><ristype>RPRT</ristype><btitle>The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II</btitle><date>1995-06-02</date><risdate>1995</risdate><abstract>This study focuses on doctrine of the U.S. Army's mechanized cavalry during World War II. The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II battlefield. Combat experience revealed that cavalry missions were not limited to reconnaissance, which constituted the main mission under mechanized cavalry doctrine, but included the complete range of traditional horse cavalry missions as well. Combat further revealed that cavalry had to fight to gain information. Although doctrine was adjusted during the war, the published tactical and operational concepts never caught up with the reality of the battlefield. The campaign in Northwest Europe confirmed many of the lessons learned in North Africa, and revealed the importance of the corps cavalry groups to corps level maneuver. The published mechanized cavalry doctrine of World War II did not meet the needs of the battlefield, yet the cavalry's combat record in World War II was impressive. This record of success, and the reasons for it, are still relevant to modern armored cavalry as well as to future Force XXI Army designs and concepts.</abstract><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | DTIC Technical Reports |
subjects | ARMORED VEHICLES ARMY BATTLEFIELDS CAVALRY CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS GLOBAL HORSES LESSONS LEARNED MANEUVERS MECHANIZATION MILITARY DOCTRINE Military Forces and Organizations MILITARY HISTORY MILITARY TACTICS MISSIONS NORTH AFRICA RECONNAISSANCE WARFARE WORLD WAR 2 |
title | The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II |
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