Distributed Charging Strategy of PEVs in SCS with Feeder Constraints Based on Generalized Nash Equilibria

In this article, a distributed charging strategy problem for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) with feeder constraints based on generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) in a novel smart charging station (SCS) is investigated. The purpose is to coordinate the charging strategies of all PEVs in SCS to minimiz...

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Veröffentlicht in:Axioms 2024-04, Vol.13 (4), p.259
Hauptverfasser: Tang, Jialong, Li, Huaqing, Chen, Menggang, Shi, Yawei, Zheng, Lifeng, Wang, Huiwei
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Sprache:eng
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Zusammenfassung:In this article, a distributed charging strategy problem for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) with feeder constraints based on generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) in a novel smart charging station (SCS) is investigated. The purpose is to coordinate the charging strategies of all PEVs in SCS to minimize the energy cost of SCS. Therefore, we build a non-cooperative game framework and propose a new price-driven charging control game by considering the overload constraint of the assigned feeder, where each PEV minimizes the fees it pays to satisfy its optimal charging strategy. On this basis, the existence of GNE is given. Furthermore, we employ a distributed algorithm based on forward–backward operator splitting methods to find the GNE. The effectiveness of the employed algorithm is verified by the final simulation results.
ISSN:2075-1680
2075-1680
DOI:10.3390/axioms13040259