Justifying Ockham’s Razor within Betz’s Theory of Dialectical Structures

According to Ockham’s razor, assumptions must not be unnecessarily multiplied. While this principle is widely accepted, its justification is controversial. More precisely, we don’t know whether Ockham’s razor is truth-conducive. The present paper aims to address this problem within Betz’s theory of dialectical structures (2012). First of all, I give a brief explanation of this theory. Here, the essential elements of Betz’s theory, which pertains to my discussion, are highlighted. Secondly, I explain why Betz’s theory is favored over the Bayesian framework. In the next step, it will be argued that, at least in the minimal complex positions, potential rivals for Ockham’s razor don’t discharge their functions unless Ockham’s razor is considered as a criterion. The fourth step amounts to the evaluation of Ockham’s razor and its rivals in the minimal complex positions. It is shown that each rival only represents an increase in the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis whereas Ockham’s razor increases the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis as well as the posterior degree of justification of the respective hypothesis. This justifies to some extent Ockham’s. Moreover, while the ratio between prima facie plausibility of two competitive hypotheses in the case of Ockham’s razor is greater than those of the potential rivals, the hypothesis with lower prima facie plausibility receives higher posterior degree of justification.