Aesthetic Properties and Perceptual Proof
According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which clai...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Kagaku tetsugaku 2014/12/20, Vol.47(2), pp.87-103 |
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description | According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics. |
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