Strategic interdependence in models of property rights

Extract: This essay explores the implications of strategic interdependence for the theory of property rights and the "new institutional economics" (Schotter). It attempts to clarify some of the linkages from institutional economics to the linkages from institutional economics to micro- and...

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Veröffentlicht in:American journal of agricultural economics 1984-12, Vol.66 (5), p.807-813
1. Verfasser: Runge, C.F
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container_title American journal of agricultural economics
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creator Runge, C.F
description Extract: This essay explores the implications of strategic interdependence for the theory of property rights and the "new institutional economics" (Schotter). It attempts to clarify some of the linkages from institutional economics to the linkages from institutional economics to micro- and macroeconomic theory by considering how property institutions result from strategic interdependence, confer payoffs to individual agents, and reflect collective choices based on individual preferences
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source Oxford University Press Journals Digital Archive legacy; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Economic benefits
Economic expectations
Economic theory
Emerging Property Rights Issues in Resource Economics
Fairness
Joint ownership
Property rights
Public land
Social innovation
Supply
Technological innovation
title Strategic interdependence in models of property rights
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