Risk regulations and disclosure in the United Arab Emirates: An institutional theory analysis

The paper aims at exploring the social, political and economic forces underlying the development and the deployment of risk disclosure regulations in the United Arab (UAE). It synthesizes an institutional theory framework in order to link the UAE institutional environment to the UAE corporations’ practices associated with risk disclosure. Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) notions of “isomorphic mechanisms”, Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) notions of “sagacious conformity” and Oliver’s (1991) notion of “strategic choice”, the paper explores the legitimation processes behind risk disclosure regulations in the UAE and, at the same time, reveals how managers put into effect and deploy these regulations. The paper relies, primarily, on the discourse analysis of textual data published in legislations, newspapers articles and annual reports published by some of the UAE corporations listed in Abu Dhabi and Dubai financial markets. The paper finds that the UAE institutional context - mainly the country’s aspiration to join global security markets, regulatory framework and accountancy profession activities - excretes pressures on individual corporations to put into effect risk disclosure regulations. In response, the UAE corporations adopt risk regulations as a “strategic disclosure” or as Oliver (1991) calls a “strategic choice” that enables those corporations to communicate a positive image to wider stakeholders. The paper adds to the literature relating to the institutional development behind risk disclosure and the disclosure management literature in emerging economies countries