Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way
Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psycho...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Metaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany) Germany), 2021-09, Vol.22 (2), p.263-283 |
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| container_title | Metaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany) |
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| creator | Noonan, Harold W. |
| description | Two of the main contenders in the debate about personal persistence over time are the neo-Lockean psychological continuity view and animalism as defended by Olson and Snowdon. Both are wrong. The position I shall argue for, which I call, following Olson, the hybrid view, takes (non-branching) psychological continuity as a sufficient but, pace the neo-Lockeans, not necessary condition for personal persistence. It sides with the animalist in allowing that mere (non-branching) biological continuity is also sufficient. So I am, in a sense, a psychological continuity theorist. But I am also in a sense, a biological theorist (or as Olson put it, a new animalist). |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1515/mp-2020-0007 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Metaphysica (Dettelbach, Germany), 2021-09, Vol.22 (2), p.263-283 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | De Gruyter journals |
| subjects | animalism neo-Lockeanism only x and y principle personal identity |
| title | Personal Identity and the Hybrid View: A Middle Way |
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