How Does a Health Insurance Program Covering 500 Million Poor Impact Credit Market Outcomes?

How Does a Health Insurance Program Covering 500 Million Poor Impact Credit Market Outcomes?

I study the impact of the world’s largest publicly funded health insurance plan for the poor on credit markets. India launched a health insurance plan that covered 500 million beneficiaries. The fact that opposition-ruled states did not implement the program for political reasons allows me to compar...

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1. Verfasser: Tantri, Prasanna
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access to finance
banking
health insurance
household finance
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description I study the impact of the world’s largest publicly funded health insurance plan for the poor on credit markets. India launched a health insurance plan that covered 500 million beneficiaries. The fact that opposition-ruled states did not implement the program for political reasons allows me to compare border districts of implemented and nonimplemented states within a difference-in-differences framework. I find that loan delinquency reduced significantly in implemented districts. Increased liquidity for loan repayment seems to be the mechanism at work. I rule out the federal-level ruling party’s influence as an explanation. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01039 .
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title How Does a Health Insurance Program Covering 500 Million Poor Impact Credit Market Outcomes?
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