Designing Deadlines
I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches....
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The American economic review 2022-03, Vol.112 (3), p.963-997 |
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| Format: | Artikel |
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| container_end_page | 997 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 963 |
| container_title | The American economic review |
| container_volume | 112 |
| creator | Madsen, Erik |
| description | I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches. When the firm can additionally learn about the project’s state from output, the optimal deadline exhibits variable sensitivity to output, with a hard deadline at the outset of the project and increasingly soft deadlines as the project’s performance declines. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1257/aer.20200212 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0002-8282 |
| ispartof | The American economic review, 2022-03, Vol.112 (3), p.963-997 |
| issn | 0002-8282 1944-7981 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1257_aer_20200212 |
| source | Business Source Complete; American Economic Association Web |
| subjects | Dauer Erwerbstätigkeit Experten Projektmanagement Theorie Vertragstheorie |
| title | Designing Deadlines |
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