Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation
To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending t...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Production and operations management 2024-11, Vol.33 (11), p.2259-2278 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 2278 |
---|---|
container_issue | 11 |
container_start_page | 2259 |
container_title | Production and operations management |
container_volume | 33 |
creator | Zhang, Yuxuan Huang, Simin Yang, S Alex |
description | To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes—bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan’s value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller’s opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1177/10591478241270121 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>sage_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1177_10591478241270121</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sage_id>10.1177_10591478241270121</sage_id><sourcerecordid>10.1177_10591478241270121</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c209t-488aaf8390e59541645e4404b2d1882bfc0891726a6c1d2967ff2eb69c48087f3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kFFLwzAUhYMoOKc_wLf-gc5707RJHnVsOhgM1D2XNL2pnTUdSSfs39sx3wSfzoVzvsvhMHaPMEOU8gEh1yik4gK5BOR4wSaoM5nmOi8ux3v001Pgmt3EuAMAmXGYsMUbdR2FdBPsB8UhmIHqZOW_yQ99OCbL1htvW98kW19TSJ6M_0zmZt8OpkteqTl0Zmh7f8uunOki3f3qlG2Xi_f5S7rePK_mj-vUctBDKpQyxqlMA421BBYiJyFAVLxGpXjlLCiNkhemsFhzXUjnOFWFtkKBki6bMjz_taGPMZAr96H9MuFYIpSnHco_O4zM7MxE01C56w_BjxX_AX4AXxVcTQ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation</title><source>SAGE Complete</source><creator>Zhang, Yuxuan ; Huang, Simin ; Yang, S Alex</creator><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Yuxuan ; Huang, Simin ; Yang, S Alex</creatorcontrib><description>To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes—bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan’s value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller’s opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1059-1478</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1937-5956</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/10591478241270121</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications</publisher><ispartof>Production and operations management, 2024-11, Vol.33 (11), p.2259-2278</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2024</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c209t-488aaf8390e59541645e4404b2d1882bfc0891726a6c1d2967ff2eb69c48087f3</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-1238-1539</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10591478241270121$$EPDF$$P50$$Gsage$$Hfree_for_read</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10591478241270121$$EHTML$$P50$$Gsage$$Hfree_for_read</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,21817,27922,27923,43619,43620</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Yuxuan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Huang, Simin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yang, S Alex</creatorcontrib><title>Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation</title><title>Production and operations management</title><description>To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes—bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan’s value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller’s opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions.</description><issn>1059-1478</issn><issn>1937-5956</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2024</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>AFRWT</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kFFLwzAUhYMoOKc_wLf-gc5707RJHnVsOhgM1D2XNL2pnTUdSSfs39sx3wSfzoVzvsvhMHaPMEOU8gEh1yik4gK5BOR4wSaoM5nmOi8ux3v001Pgmt3EuAMAmXGYsMUbdR2FdBPsB8UhmIHqZOW_yQ99OCbL1htvW98kW19TSJ6M_0zmZt8OpkteqTl0Zmh7f8uunOki3f3qlG2Xi_f5S7rePK_mj-vUctBDKpQyxqlMA421BBYiJyFAVLxGpXjlLCiNkhemsFhzXUjnOFWFtkKBki6bMjz_taGPMZAr96H9MuFYIpSnHco_O4zM7MxE01C56w_BjxX_AX4AXxVcTQ</recordid><startdate>202411</startdate><enddate>202411</enddate><creator>Zhang, Yuxuan</creator><creator>Huang, Simin</creator><creator>Yang, S Alex</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><scope>AFRWT</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1238-1539</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>202411</creationdate><title>Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation</title><author>Zhang, Yuxuan ; Huang, Simin ; Yang, S Alex</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c209t-488aaf8390e59541645e4404b2d1882bfc0891726a6c1d2967ff2eb69c48087f3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2024</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Zhang, Yuxuan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Huang, Simin</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yang, S Alex</creatorcontrib><collection>Sage Journals GOLD Open Access 2024</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Production and operations management</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Zhang, Yuxuan</au><au>Huang, Simin</au><au>Yang, S Alex</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation</atitle><jtitle>Production and operations management</jtitle><date>2024-11</date><risdate>2024</risdate><volume>33</volume><issue>11</issue><spage>2259</spage><epage>2278</epage><pages>2259-2278</pages><issn>1059-1478</issn><eissn>1937-5956</eissn><abstract>To help small firms secure bank financing, large sellers often orchestrate joint finance programs, linking their small dealers with major banks that lend to all participating dealers based on the information the seller provides. We examine supply chain decisions (pricing and inventory) and lending terms under such seller-orchestrated financing programs. In loan pricing, we highlight a form of financial friction that is of particular importance under such schemes—bank capital regulation. Banks are globally mandated to maintain regulatory capital to mitigate unforeseen loan losses, using either the standardized approach (where regulatory capital is a fixed percentage of the loan amount) or the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (where it depends on the loan’s value-at-risk). We consider a game-theoretic model consisting of a large seller and multiple capital-constrained newsvendor-type dealers, who obtain financing from banks that are subject to capital regulation. The seller decides the wholesale price and whether to orchestrate a joint finance program for its dealers by collaborating with a bank, and the dealers choose their inventory level and the financing channel. We find that a seller should only orchestrate the joint financing program when the bank adopts the IRB approach and the dealers are of low risk. Such a program is more profitable to the seller when the demand correlation among dealers is low, and there is a large number of dealers. Although always benefiting the seller, these programs may hurt dealers with intermediate risk. Facing dealers with varying financial situations, the terms under the joint finance program should be designed as if the financially strong dealers subsidize the weak ones. Finally, allowing the seller to share part of the loan loss could further enhance the performance of joint financing, but only when the seller’s opportunity cost of capital is low. Our findings provide guidance to large sellers on how to orchestrate joint finance schemes, and to small dealers on making their corresponding operational decisions.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>SAGE Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/10591478241270121</doi><tpages>20</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1238-1539</orcidid><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 1059-1478 |
ispartof | Production and operations management, 2024-11, Vol.33 (11), p.2259-2278 |
issn | 1059-1478 1937-5956 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1177_10591478241270121 |
source | SAGE Complete |
title | Seller-Orchestrated Inventory Financing Under Bank Capital Regulation |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-10T09%3A34%3A56IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-sage_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Seller-Orchestrated%20Inventory%20Financing%20Under%20Bank%20Capital%20Regulation&rft.jtitle=Production%20and%20operations%20management&rft.au=Zhang,%20Yuxuan&rft.date=2024-11&rft.volume=33&rft.issue=11&rft.spage=2259&rft.epage=2278&rft.pages=2259-2278&rft.issn=1059-1478&rft.eissn=1937-5956&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/10591478241270121&rft_dat=%3Csage_cross%3E10.1177_10591478241270121%3C/sage_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_sage_id=10.1177_10591478241270121&rfr_iscdi=true |