VoltJockey: Abusing the Processor Voltage to Break Arm TrustZone

VoltJockey: Abusing the Processor Voltage to Break Arm TrustZone

Based on the concept of hardware separation, ARM introduced TrustZone to build a trusted execution environment for applications. It has been quite successful in defending against various software attacks and forcing attackers to explore vulnerabilities in interface designs and side channels. In this...

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Veröffentlicht in:GetMobile (New York, N.Y.) N.Y.), 2020-09, Vol.24 (2), p.30-33
Hauptverfasser: Qui, Pengfei, Wang, Dongsheng, Lyu, Yongqiang, Qu, Gang
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container_issue 2
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container_title GetMobile (New York, N.Y.)
container_volume 24
creator Qui, Pengfei
Wang, Dongsheng
Lyu, Yongqiang
Qu, Gang
description Based on the concept of hardware separation, ARM introduced TrustZone to build a trusted execution environment for applications. It has been quite successful in defending against various software attacks and forcing attackers to explore vulnerabilities in interface designs and side channels. In this article, we propose an innovative software-controlled hardware fault-based attack, VoltJockey, on multi-core processors that adopt dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) techniques for energy efficiency. We deliberately manipulate the processor voltage via DVFS to induce hardware faults into the victim cores, and therefore breaking TrustZone. The entire attack process is based on software without any involvement of hardware, which makes VoltJockey stealthy and hard to prevent.
doi_str_mv 10.1145/3427384.3427394
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title VoltJockey: Abusing the Processor Voltage to Break Arm TrustZone
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