Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-Pay Auction Approach

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act according to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose a...

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Veröffentlicht in:	ACM transactions on intelligent systems and technology 2016-04, Vol.7 (3), p.1-26
Hauptverfasser:	Luo, Tie, Das, Sajal K., Tan, Hwee Pink, Xia, Lirong
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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