Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy
This article presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to design new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user’s selection, o...
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Veröffentlicht in: | ACM transactions on information and system security 2010-12, Vol.13 (4), p.1-32 |
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creator | Kate, Aniket Zaverucha, Greg M. Goldberg, Ian |
description | This article presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to design new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user’s selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by the Tor project. Further, the use of an identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1145/1880022.1880023 |
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title | Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy |
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