Equilibrium contained by counter-threats and complex equilibrium in secure strategies
We present two generalizations of the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies. In equilibrium contained by counter-threats (ECCT), no player can increase its payoff by a unilateral deviation without creating a threat to lose more than it wins. This condition must be satisfied for any pseudo-equi...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Automation and remote control 2016-03, Vol.77 (3), p.495-509 |
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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