Equilibrium contained by counter-threats and complex equilibrium in secure strategies

We present two generalizations of the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies. In equilibrium contained by counter-threats (ECCT), no player can increase its payoff by a unilateral deviation without creating a threat to lose more than it wins. This condition must be satisfied for any pseudo-equi...

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Veröffentlicht in:Automation and remote control 2016-03, Vol.77 (3), p.495-509
Hauptverfasser: Iskakov, M. B., Iskakov, A. B.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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