More on Idealism and Skepticism
In “Idealism and Skepticism: A Reply to Brueckner”, Stephen Puryear maintains that Berkeley holds at most that ideas that “count as real things” as opposed to chimeras (e.g., my idea of the Eiffel Tower) must satisfy a criterion of intra‐mind coherence. On this reading of Berkeley, my claim that a f...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Theoria (Lund, Sweden) Sweden), 2014-02, Vol.80 (1), p.98-99 |
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| container_title | Theoria (Lund, Sweden) |
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| creator | Brueckner, Anthony |
| description | In “Idealism and Skepticism: A Reply to Brueckner”, Stephen Puryear maintains that Berkeley holds at most that ideas that “count as real things” as opposed to chimeras (e.g., my idea of the Eiffel Tower) must satisfy a criterion of intra‐mind coherence. On this reading of Berkeley, my claim that a form of external‐world epistemological skepticism can be constructed within Berkeley's metaphysical system cannot get off the ground. I respond here. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/theo.12040 |
| format | Article |
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| subjects | Berkeley idea idealism Puryear skepticism |
| title | More on Idealism and Skepticism |
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