Informed equity ownership and bank loan contracting

Banks enter into loan contracts facing information asymmetries that demand costly due diligence and monitoring efforts. We hypothesize that enhanced monitoring could reduce information asymmetry and result in more favorable loan terms. We take local institutional ownership (IO) as a proxy for inform...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of business finance & accounting 2021-07, Vol.48 (7-8), p.1368-1403
Hauptverfasser: Chang, Kiyoung, Li, Ying, Yi, Ha‐Chin
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
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