Basic Self‐Awareness: Lessons from the Real World
Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | European journal of philosophy 2017-09, Vol.25 (3), p.732-763 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 763 |
---|---|
container_issue | 3 |
container_start_page | 732 |
container_title | European journal of philosophy |
container_volume | 25 |
creator | Billon, Alexandre |
description | Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/ejop.12168 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>crossref</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1111_ejop_12168</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>10_1111_ejop_12168</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-cf97c17697fa565c49f36b3e4ff64da9c30a46957e39ba1372322bce7051cf73</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNotz81KQzEQhuEgCh6rGxeuXRdSZ87kTJJlLf5BoYt2H3LGBFqqLYkg7ryEXmOvpFb9Nu_ug0epa4QR_uwurTbbEbbI7kQ1aNhpIOtOVQOeWTuydK4ual0BAHl2jbq5j3Upt_O0zvvv3fgzlvSear1UZzmua7r670AtHh8Wk2c9nT29TMZTLejhQ0v2VtCytzl23InxmbinZHJm8xq9EETDvrOJfB-RbEtt20uy0KFkSwM1_LuVsqm1pBy2ZfkWy1dACEdQOILCL4gO_4s9vw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Basic Self‐Awareness: Lessons from the Real World</title><source>Access via Wiley Online Library</source><creator>Billon, Alexandre</creator><creatorcontrib>Billon, Alexandre</creatorcontrib><description>Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0966-8373</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-0378</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12168</identifier><language>eng</language><ispartof>European journal of philosophy, 2017-09, Vol.25 (3), p.732-763</ispartof><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-cf97c17697fa565c49f36b3e4ff64da9c30a46957e39ba1372322bce7051cf73</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Billon, Alexandre</creatorcontrib><title>Basic Self‐Awareness: Lessons from the Real World</title><title>European journal of philosophy</title><description>Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.</description><issn>0966-8373</issn><issn>1468-0378</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2017</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNotz81KQzEQhuEgCh6rGxeuXRdSZ87kTJJlLf5BoYt2H3LGBFqqLYkg7ryEXmOvpFb9Nu_ug0epa4QR_uwurTbbEbbI7kQ1aNhpIOtOVQOeWTuydK4ual0BAHl2jbq5j3Upt_O0zvvv3fgzlvSear1UZzmua7r670AtHh8Wk2c9nT29TMZTLejhQ0v2VtCytzl23InxmbinZHJm8xq9EETDvrOJfB-RbEtt20uy0KFkSwM1_LuVsqm1pBy2ZfkWy1dACEdQOILCL4gO_4s9vw</recordid><startdate>201709</startdate><enddate>201709</enddate><creator>Billon, Alexandre</creator><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201709</creationdate><title>Basic Self‐Awareness</title><author>Billon, Alexandre</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c190t-cf97c17697fa565c49f36b3e4ff64da9c30a46957e39ba1372322bce7051cf73</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2017</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Billon, Alexandre</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>European journal of philosophy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Billon, Alexandre</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Basic Self‐Awareness: Lessons from the Real World</atitle><jtitle>European journal of philosophy</jtitle><date>2017-09</date><risdate>2017</risdate><volume>25</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>732</spage><epage>763</epage><pages>732-763</pages><issn>0966-8373</issn><eissn>1468-0378</eissn><abstract>Basic self‐awareness is the kind of self‐awareness reflected in our standard use of the first‐person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first‐person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third‐person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self‐awareness. In this paper, I argue that depersonalized patients indeed have an impaired basic self‐awareness, and that their study allows us both to favor one specific theory of basic self‐awareness and to understand what is wrong with its rivals. According to the favored theory, which I call Cartesian, we are basically self‐aware in virtue of being acquainted with ourselves through introspection.</abstract><doi>10.1111/ejop.12168</doi><tpages>32</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext |
identifier | ISSN: 0966-8373 |
ispartof | European journal of philosophy, 2017-09, Vol.25 (3), p.732-763 |
issn | 0966-8373 1468-0378 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1111_ejop_12168 |
source | Access via Wiley Online Library |
title | Basic Self‐Awareness: Lessons from the Real World |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-26T19%3A21%3A44IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-crossref&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Basic%20Self%E2%80%90Awareness:%20Lessons%20from%20the%20Real%20World&rft.jtitle=European%20journal%20of%20philosophy&rft.au=Billon,%20Alexandre&rft.date=2017-09&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=732&rft.epage=763&rft.pages=732-763&rft.issn=0966-8373&rft.eissn=1468-0378&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/ejop.12168&rft_dat=%3Ccrossref%3E10_1111_ejop_12168%3C/crossref%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true |