Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the col...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Review of economic studies 2002-10, Vol.69 (4), p.973-997
Hauptverfasser: Offerman, Theo, Potters, Jan, Sonnemans, Joep
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creator Offerman, Theo
Potters, Jan
Sonnemans, Joep
description We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot—Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes.
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source Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current); EBSCOhost Business Source Complete
subjects Capital costs
Collusion
Individualization
Information feedback
Learning
Modeling
Observational learning
Oligopolies
Production costs
Production levels
title Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
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