Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influe...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Review of economic studies 2001-01, Vol.68 (1), p.45-66
Hauptverfasser:	Fairburn, James A., Malcomson, James M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Business risks Employee efficiency Employee motivation Employees Incentive pay Job performance Job performance evaluation Pay for performance Risk aversion Wages
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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