A Novel Stealthy Attack to Gather SDN Configuration-Information
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a recent network architecture based on the separation of forwarding functions from network logic, and provides high flexibility in the management of the network. In this paper, we show how an attacker can exploit SDN programmability to obtain detailed knowledge a...
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Veröffentlicht in: | IEEE transactions on emerging topics in computing 2020-04, Vol.8 (2), p.328-340 |
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description | Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a recent network architecture based on the separation of forwarding functions from network logic, and provides high flexibility in the management of the network. In this paper, we show how an attacker can exploit SDN programmability to obtain detailed knowledge about the network behaviour. In particular, we introduce a novel attack, named Know Your Enemy (KYE), which allows an attacker to gather vital information about the configuration of the network. Through the KYE attack, an attacker can obtain information ranging from the configuration of security tools, such as attack detection thresholds for network scanning, to general network policies like QoS and network virtualization. Additionally, we show that the KYE attack can be performed in a stealthy fashion, allowing an attacker to learn configuration secrets without being detected. We underline that the vulnerability exploited by the KYE attack is proper of SDN and is not present in legacy networks. Finally, we address the KYE attack by proposing an active defense countermeasure based on network flows obfuscation, which considerably increases the complexity for a successful attack. Our solution offers provable security guarantees that can be tailored to the needs of the specific network under consideration. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1109/TETC.2018.2806977 |
format | Article |
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In this paper, we show how an attacker can exploit SDN programmability to obtain detailed knowledge about the network behaviour. In particular, we introduce a novel attack, named Know Your Enemy (KYE), which allows an attacker to gather vital information about the configuration of the network. Through the KYE attack, an attacker can obtain information ranging from the configuration of security tools, such as attack detection thresholds for network scanning, to general network policies like QoS and network virtualization. Additionally, we show that the KYE attack can be performed in a stealthy fashion, allowing an attacker to learn configuration secrets without being detected. We underline that the vulnerability exploited by the KYE attack is proper of SDN and is not present in legacy networks. Finally, we address the KYE attack by proposing an active defense countermeasure based on network flows obfuscation, which considerably increases the complexity for a successful attack. 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In this paper, we show how an attacker can exploit SDN programmability to obtain detailed knowledge about the network behaviour. In particular, we introduce a novel attack, named Know Your Enemy (KYE), which allows an attacker to gather vital information about the configuration of the network. Through the KYE attack, an attacker can obtain information ranging from the configuration of security tools, such as attack detection thresholds for network scanning, to general network policies like QoS and network virtualization. Additionally, we show that the KYE attack can be performed in a stealthy fashion, allowing an attacker to learn configuration secrets without being detected. We underline that the vulnerability exploited by the KYE attack is proper of SDN and is not present in legacy networks. Finally, we address the KYE attack by proposing an active defense countermeasure based on network flows obfuscation, which considerably increases the complexity for a successful attack. Our solution offers provable security guarantees that can be tailored to the needs of the specific network under consideration.</description><subject>Computer architecture</subject><subject>Configurations</subject><subject>Control systems</subject><subject>Cybersecurity</subject><subject>Decision making</subject><subject>Network architecture</subject><subject>Quality of service architectures</subject><subject>SDN</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>side-channel</subject><subject>Software defined networking</subject><subject>stealth information-gathering</subject><subject>Virtualization</subject><issn>2168-6750</issn><issn>2168-6750</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpNkE9PAjEQxRujiQT5AMZLE8-LbWf7Z0-GoCIJwQN4brrdVhZhi91iwrd3EWKcy7zDezMvP4RuKRlSSoqH5fNyPGSEqiFTRBRSXqAeo0JlQnJy-U9fo0Hbrkk3iopCyB56HOF5-HYbvEjObNLqgEcpGfuJU8ATk1Yu4sXTHI9D4-uPfTSpDk02bXyI2199g6682bRucN599P7StXnNZm-T6Xg0yyyASFkOhQAnSlDWMuYL66XPrSE5K0peUknAVXnFVekoL0ECSCOENJ4xqDpZQR_dn-7uYvjauzbpddjHpnupWU4JpxIo71z05LIxtG10Xu9ivTXxoCnRR1T6iEofUekzqi5zd8rUzrk_v2IFKMHhBzieYzY</recordid><startdate>20200401</startdate><enddate>20200401</enddate><creator>Conti, Mauro</creator><creator>De Gaspari, Fabio</creator><creator>Mancini, Luigi V.</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 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subjects | Computer architecture Configurations Control systems Cybersecurity Decision making Network architecture Quality of service architectures SDN Security side-channel Software defined networking stealth information-gathering Virtualization |
title | A Novel Stealthy Attack to Gather SDN Configuration-Information |
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