GNSS Spoofing and Detection
Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the IEEE 2016-06, Vol.104 (6), p.1258-1270 |
---|---|
Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext bestellen |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
container_end_page | 1270 |
---|---|
container_issue | 6 |
container_start_page | 1258 |
container_title | Proceedings of the IEEE |
container_volume | 104 |
creator | Psiaki, Mark L. Humphreys, Todd E. |
description | Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2526658 |
format | Article |
fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_RIE</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1109_JPROC_2016_2526658</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><ieee_id>7445815</ieee_id><sourcerecordid>1816076960</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c447t-848ee114b1e482922a68ab813c701e58d7724aea442d9764744030e7412c65203</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpdkD9PAkEQRzdGExH9AtKQ2Ngczszt39KgooaIEa03yzGYI3CLt0fht_cQYmE1zXuTX54QlwgDRHA3z69vk-GAAPWAFGmt7JHooFI2I1L6WHQA0GaO0J2Ks5SWAJArnXdEb_QynfanmxgXZfXZD9W8f8cNF00Zq3NxsgirxBeH2xUfD_fvw8dsPBk9DW_HWSGlaTIrLTOinCFLS44oaBtmFvPCALKyc2NIBg5S0twZLY2UkAMbiVRoRZB3xfX-76aOX1tOjV-XqeDVKlQct8mjRQ1GO71Dr_6hy7itq3adR-NAWyeBWor2VFHHlGpe-E1drkP97RH8rpf_7eV3vfyhVyv19lLJzH9CO1ZZVPkPNJBh8A</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1790689402</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>GNSS Spoofing and Detection</title><source>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</source><creator>Psiaki, Mark L. ; Humphreys, Todd E.</creator><creatorcontrib>Psiaki, Mark L. ; Humphreys, Todd E.</creatorcontrib><description>Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0018-9219</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1558-2256</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2526658</identifier><identifier>CODEN: IEEPAD</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: IEEE</publisher><subject>Defense ; Global navigation satellite system ; Global Positioning System ; GNSS ; GPS ; Military aircraft ; Navigation satellites ; Receivers ; Recommendations ; Satellite navigation systems ; Security ; Spoofing ; spoofing detection ; Tracking loops ; Unmanned aerial vehicles</subject><ispartof>Proceedings of the IEEE, 2016-06, Vol.104 (6), p.1258-1270</ispartof><rights>Copyright The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) 2016</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c447t-848ee114b1e482922a68ab813c701e58d7724aea442d9764744030e7412c65203</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c447t-848ee114b1e482922a68ab813c701e58d7724aea442d9764744030e7412c65203</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7445815$$EHTML$$P50$$Gieee$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>315,781,785,797,27928,27929,54762</link.rule.ids><linktorsrc>$$Uhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7445815$$EView_record_in_IEEE$$FView_record_in_$$GIEEE</linktorsrc></links><search><creatorcontrib>Psiaki, Mark L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Humphreys, Todd E.</creatorcontrib><title>GNSS Spoofing and Detection</title><title>Proceedings of the IEEE</title><addtitle>JPROC</addtitle><description>Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable.</description><subject>Defense</subject><subject>Global navigation satellite system</subject><subject>Global Positioning System</subject><subject>GNSS</subject><subject>GPS</subject><subject>Military aircraft</subject><subject>Navigation satellites</subject><subject>Receivers</subject><subject>Recommendations</subject><subject>Satellite navigation systems</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>Spoofing</subject><subject>spoofing detection</subject><subject>Tracking loops</subject><subject>Unmanned aerial vehicles</subject><issn>0018-9219</issn><issn>1558-2256</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2016</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>RIE</sourceid><recordid>eNpdkD9PAkEQRzdGExH9AtKQ2Ngczszt39KgooaIEa03yzGYI3CLt0fht_cQYmE1zXuTX54QlwgDRHA3z69vk-GAAPWAFGmt7JHooFI2I1L6WHQA0GaO0J2Ks5SWAJArnXdEb_QynfanmxgXZfXZD9W8f8cNF00Zq3NxsgirxBeH2xUfD_fvw8dsPBk9DW_HWSGlaTIrLTOinCFLS44oaBtmFvPCALKyc2NIBg5S0twZLY2UkAMbiVRoRZB3xfX-76aOX1tOjV-XqeDVKlQct8mjRQ1GO71Dr_6hy7itq3adR-NAWyeBWor2VFHHlGpe-E1drkP97RH8rpf_7eV3vfyhVyv19lLJzH9CO1ZZVPkPNJBh8A</recordid><startdate>201606</startdate><enddate>201606</enddate><creator>Psiaki, Mark L.</creator><creator>Humphreys, Todd E.</creator><general>IEEE</general><general>The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)</general><scope>97E</scope><scope>RIA</scope><scope>RIE</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7SP</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>L7M</scope><scope>F28</scope><scope>FR3</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201606</creationdate><title>GNSS Spoofing and Detection</title><author>Psiaki, Mark L. ; Humphreys, Todd E.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c447t-848ee114b1e482922a68ab813c701e58d7724aea442d9764744030e7412c65203</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2016</creationdate><topic>Defense</topic><topic>Global navigation satellite system</topic><topic>Global Positioning System</topic><topic>GNSS</topic><topic>GPS</topic><topic>Military aircraft</topic><topic>Navigation satellites</topic><topic>Receivers</topic><topic>Recommendations</topic><topic>Satellite navigation systems</topic><topic>Security</topic><topic>Spoofing</topic><topic>spoofing detection</topic><topic>Tracking loops</topic><topic>Unmanned aerial vehicles</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Psiaki, Mark L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Humphreys, Todd E.</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Electronic Library (IEL)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Electronics & Communications Abstracts</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Advanced Technologies Database with Aerospace</collection><collection>ANTE: Abstracts in New Technology & Engineering</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><jtitle>Proceedings of the IEEE</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext_linktorsrc</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Psiaki, Mark L.</au><au>Humphreys, Todd E.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>GNSS Spoofing and Detection</atitle><jtitle>Proceedings of the IEEE</jtitle><stitle>JPROC</stitle><date>2016-06</date><risdate>2016</risdate><volume>104</volume><issue>6</issue><spage>1258</spage><epage>1270</epage><pages>1258-1270</pages><issn>0018-9219</issn><eissn>1558-2256</eissn><coden>IEEPAD</coden><abstract>Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/JPROC.2016.2526658</doi><tpages>13</tpages></addata></record> |
fulltext | fulltext_linktorsrc |
identifier | ISSN: 0018-9219 |
ispartof | Proceedings of the IEEE, 2016-06, Vol.104 (6), p.1258-1270 |
issn | 0018-9219 1558-2256 |
language | eng |
recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1109_JPROC_2016_2526658 |
source | IEEE Electronic Library (IEL) |
subjects | Defense Global navigation satellite system Global Positioning System GNSS GPS Military aircraft Navigation satellites Receivers Recommendations Satellite navigation systems Security Spoofing spoofing detection Tracking loops Unmanned aerial vehicles |
title | GNSS Spoofing and Detection |
url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-17T00%3A09%3A02IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_RIE&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=GNSS%20Spoofing%20and%20Detection&rft.jtitle=Proceedings%20of%20the%20IEEE&rft.au=Psiaki,%20Mark%20L.&rft.date=2016-06&rft.volume=104&rft.issue=6&rft.spage=1258&rft.epage=1270&rft.pages=1258-1270&rft.issn=0018-9219&rft.eissn=1558-2256&rft.coden=IEEPAD&rft_id=info:doi/10.1109/JPROC.2016.2526658&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_RIE%3E1816076960%3C/proquest_RIE%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1790689402&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_ieee_id=7445815&rfr_iscdi=true |