Honest signalling with costly gambles

Costly signalling theory is commonly invoked as an explanation for how honest communication can be stable when interests conflict. However, the signal costs predicted by costly signalling models often turn out to be unrealistically high. These models generally assume that signal cost is determinate....

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of the Royal Society interface 2013-10, Vol.10 (87), p.20130469-20130469
Hauptverfasser:	Meacham, Frazer, Perlmutter, Aaron, Bergstrom, Carl T.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Communication Costly Signalling Game Theory Handicap Theory Humans Risk Risk Aversion Stochastic Processes
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!