The Imitation Game: The Imitation Game: How Encouraging Renegotiation Makes Good Borrowers Bad
Abstract We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers’ use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotia...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of financial studies 2024-12, Vol.37 (12), p.3648-3709 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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