Freeze! Financial Sanctions and Bank Responses
Abstract Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank af...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Review of financial studies 2023-11, Vol.36 (11), p.4417-4459 |
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creator | Efing, Matthias Goldbach, Stefan Nitsch, Volker |
description | Abstract
Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.
Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/rfs/hhad043 |
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Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.
Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online</description><identifier>ISSN: 0893-9454</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1465-7368</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhad043</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>2002-2015 ; Deutschland ; Filiale ; Internationale Bank ; Kreditgeschäft ; Sanktion ; Welt</subject><ispartof>The Review of financial studies, 2023-11, Vol.36 (11), p.4417-4459</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. [br]For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. 2023</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c354t-ddc33f96527938f2da5f88ae93f302fdd543303dd20fe3b12a9404d43dfde8b33</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c354t-ddc33f96527938f2da5f88ae93f302fdd543303dd20fe3b12a9404d43dfde8b33</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,1579,27905,27906</link.rule.ids></links><search><contributor>Puri, Manju</contributor><creatorcontrib>Efing, Matthias</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Goldbach, Stefan</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Nitsch, Volker</creatorcontrib><title>Freeze! Financial Sanctions and Bank Responses</title><title>The Review of financial studies</title><description>Abstract
Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.
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Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.
Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online</abstract><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/rfs/hhad043</doi><tpages>43</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | 2002-2015 Deutschland Filiale Internationale Bank Kreditgeschäft Sanktion Welt |
title | Freeze! Financial Sanctions and Bank Responses |
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