GRICEAN COMMUNICATION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT
On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others' goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth-order metarepresentations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-re...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Philosophical quarterly 2017-04, Vol.67 (267), p.303-326 |
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| container_title | The Philosophical quarterly |
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| creator | Moore, Richard |
| description | On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others' goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth-order metarepresentations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-requisites of Gricean communication, they are inconsistent with the view that Gricean communication could play a role in their development. In this paper, I argue that a class of 'minimally Gricean' acts satisfy the intentional structure described by Grice, but require none of abilities (a)—(c). As a result, Gricean communicative abilities may indeed contribute to the development of(a)—(c)—in particular, by enabling language development. This conclusion has important implications for our theorizing about cognitive development. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/pq/pqw049 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The Philosophical quarterly, 2017-04, Vol.67 (267), p.303-326 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| title | GRICEAN COMMUNICATION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT |
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