The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis

Abstract In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Re...

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Veröffentlicht in:Oxford economic papers 2020-04, Vol.72 (2), p.472-500
Hauptverfasser: Dolphin, Geoffroy, Pollitt, Michael G, Newbery, David M
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creator Dolphin, Geoffroy
Pollitt, Michael G
Newbery, David M
description Abstract In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple instruments.
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source Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current)
subjects Gesetzgebung
Internationale Klimapolitik
Kanada
Treibhausgas-Emissionen
USA
Ökosteuer
title The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis
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