The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis
Abstract In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Re...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Oxford economic papers 2020-04, Vol.72 (2), p.472-500 |
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creator | Dolphin, Geoffroy Pollitt, Michael G Newbery, David M |
description | Abstract
In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple instruments. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oep/gpz042 |
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In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple instruments.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0030-7653</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1464-3812</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpz042</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Gesetzgebung ; Internationale Klimapolitik ; Kanada ; Treibhausgas-Emissionen ; USA ; Ökosteuer</subject><ispartof>Oxford economic papers, 2020-04, Vol.72 (2), p.472-500</ispartof><rights>Oxford University Press 2019. All rights reserved. 2019</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-2cf83b5e5427516cbf6366fb0989ec7fd1638f463443cae23163cc81124ca0073</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-2cf83b5e5427516cbf6366fb0989ec7fd1638f463443cae23163cc81124ca0073</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,1579,27905,27906</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dolphin, Geoffroy</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pollitt, Michael G</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Newbery, David M</creatorcontrib><title>The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis</title><title>Oxford economic papers</title><description>Abstract
In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple instruments.</description><subject>Gesetzgebung</subject><subject>Internationale Klimapolitik</subject><subject>Kanada</subject><subject>Treibhausgas-Emissionen</subject><subject>USA</subject><subject>Ökosteuer</subject><issn>0030-7653</issn><issn>1464-3812</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2020</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9j8FKxDAURYMoWEc3fkE2boQ6L3lp0riTwVFhwM24LukzGSudpjTjon69HSq4c3W5cLjcw9i1gDsBFpfR98td_w1KnrBMKK1yLIU8ZRkAQm50gefsIqVPAFBQmIzZ7YfnfWybQ0Ou5Z5iF_cjj4GTG-rY8X5oqOl299zx3nW-5a5z7ZiadMnOgmuTv_rNBXtbP25Xz_nm9ell9bDJCUtzyCWFEuvCF0qaQmiqg0atQw22tJ5MeBcay6A0KoXkvMSpE5VCSEUOwOCC3c67NMSUBh-q6dLeDWMloDpKV5N0NUtPMJ_ho0iT_lBt0Vg7OU_IzYzEr_6_qR86wmFa</recordid><startdate>20200401</startdate><enddate>20200401</enddate><creator>Dolphin, Geoffroy</creator><creator>Pollitt, Michael G</creator><creator>Newbery, David M</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>OQ6</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20200401</creationdate><title>The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis</title><author>Dolphin, Geoffroy ; Pollitt, Michael G ; Newbery, David M</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c387t-2cf83b5e5427516cbf6366fb0989ec7fd1638f463443cae23163cc81124ca0073</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2020</creationdate><topic>Gesetzgebung</topic><topic>Internationale Klimapolitik</topic><topic>Kanada</topic><topic>Treibhausgas-Emissionen</topic><topic>USA</topic><topic>Ökosteuer</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dolphin, Geoffroy</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pollitt, Michael G</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Newbery, David M</creatorcontrib><collection>ECONIS</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Oxford economic papers</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dolphin, Geoffroy</au><au>Pollitt, Michael G</au><au>Newbery, David M</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis</atitle><jtitle>Oxford economic papers</jtitle><date>2020-04-01</date><risdate>2020</risdate><volume>72</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>472</spage><epage>500</epage><pages>472-500</pages><issn>0030-7653</issn><eissn>1464-3812</eissn><abstract>Abstract
In virtually all jurisdictions that explicitly price carbon, its average (emissions-weighted) price remains low. Our analysis focuses on the political economy of its introduction as well as its stringency in an international panel of national and North American subnational jurisdictions. Results suggest that political economy factors primarily affected the former and that policy stringency is a highly persistent process. This has two important policy implications. First, successful passage of carbon pricing legislation will either come with contemporaneous compensation of incumbent, CO2-intensive, sectors or occur after their relative weakening. Second, if political economy constraints continue to prevail, climate change mitigation strategies will require multiple instruments.</abstract><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/oep/gpz042</doi><tpages>29</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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source | Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
subjects | Gesetzgebung Internationale Klimapolitik Kanada Treibhausgas-Emissionen USA Ökosteuer |
title | The political economy of carbon pricing: a panel analysis |
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