Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues
We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and loc...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of law, economics, & organization economics, & organization, 2018-08, Vol.34 (3), p.395-424 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 424 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 395 |
| container_title | Journal of law, economics, & organization |
| container_volume | 34 |
| creator | Peskowitz, Zachary Sridharan, Suhas A. |
| description | We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/jleo/ewy010 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1093_jleo_ewy010</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>48554844</jstor_id><oup_id>10.1093/jleo/ewy010</oup_id><sourcerecordid>48554844</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-d0411948952a304a042025de91c339320ff21fbfee97e7fcb7ce6e34db115fa23</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFz0tLxDAUhuEgCtbRlWuhKzdOnZxc2mYp460w4Cx0XdI2wZTalJwMMv_eGSpuPZuzefjgJeQa6D1QxVf9YPzKfO8p0BOSgMhlVnABpyQpC5lnOWPsnFwg9vRwiquEyK0O0aEe8dNNy3TrBxddq4e0GjG6uIvOj7hM9dilj6aJaYW4M3hJzqwe0Fz9_gX5eH56X79mm7eXav2wyVouIWYdFQBKlEoyzanQVDDKZGcUtJwrzqi1DGxjjVGFKWzbFK3JDRddAyCtZnxB7ubdNnjEYGw9Bfelw74GWh-L62NxPRcf9O2s_W76B97MsMfowx8VpZSiFIL_ACKrYRA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype></control><display><type>article</type><title>Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues</title><source>Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current)</source><creator>Peskowitz, Zachary ; Sridharan, Suhas A.</creator><creatorcontrib>Peskowitz, Zachary ; Sridharan, Suhas A.</creatorcontrib><description>We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments.</description><identifier>ISSN: 8756-6222</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1465-7341</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewy010</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford University Press</publisher><ispartof>Journal of law, economics, & organization, 2018-08, Vol.34 (3), p.395-424</ispartof><rights>The Author(s) 2018</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-d0411948952a304a042025de91c339320ff21fbfee97e7fcb7ce6e34db115fa23</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-d0411948952a304a042025de91c339320ff21fbfee97e7fcb7ce6e34db115fa23</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1578,27901,27902</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Peskowitz, Zachary</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sridharan, Suhas A.</creatorcontrib><title>Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues</title><title>Journal of law, economics, & organization</title><description>We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments.</description><issn>8756-6222</issn><issn>1465-7341</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFz0tLxDAUhuEgCtbRlWuhKzdOnZxc2mYp460w4Cx0XdI2wZTalJwMMv_eGSpuPZuzefjgJeQa6D1QxVf9YPzKfO8p0BOSgMhlVnABpyQpC5lnOWPsnFwg9vRwiquEyK0O0aEe8dNNy3TrBxddq4e0GjG6uIvOj7hM9dilj6aJaYW4M3hJzqwe0Fz9_gX5eH56X79mm7eXav2wyVouIWYdFQBKlEoyzanQVDDKZGcUtJwrzqi1DGxjjVGFKWzbFK3JDRddAyCtZnxB7ubdNnjEYGw9Bfelw74GWh-L62NxPRcf9O2s_W76B97MsMfowx8VpZSiFIL_ACKrYRA</recordid><startdate>20180801</startdate><enddate>20180801</enddate><creator>Peskowitz, Zachary</creator><creator>Sridharan, Suhas A.</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20180801</creationdate><title>Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues</title><author>Peskowitz, Zachary ; Sridharan, Suhas A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-d0411948952a304a042025de91c339320ff21fbfee97e7fcb7ce6e34db115fa23</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Peskowitz, Zachary</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sridharan, Suhas A.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Journal of law, economics, & organization</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Peskowitz, Zachary</au><au>Sridharan, Suhas A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues</atitle><jtitle>Journal of law, economics, & organization</jtitle><date>2018-08-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>34</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>395</spage><epage>424</epage><pages>395-424</pages><issn>8756-6222</issn><eissn>1465-7341</eissn><abstract>We investigate the effect of gubernatorial partisanship on municipal bond issues in the United States using a regression discontinuity design. Our unique dataset of individual bond issues allows us to precisely measure the issuing behavior of different entity types—states, state authorities, and localities—and examine how the response of debt issues to gubernatorial partisanship varies across jurisdictions. The election of Democratic governors results in higher levels of debt issuance, with an annual per capita increase of approximately $73–$147 in states that lack debt referenda requirements. In states with debt referenda requirements, the estimated per capita annual effect of a Democratic governor is approximately $23–$28. We find that governors are not able to circumvent debt referenda requirements by issuing debt through state authorities or local governments.</abstract><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/jleo/ewy010</doi><tpages>30</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 8756-6222 |
| ispartof | Journal of law, economics, & organization, 2018-08, Vol.34 (3), p.395-424 |
| issn | 8756-6222 1465-7341 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1093_jleo_ewy010 |
| source | Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| title | Partisanship, Political Institutions, and Debt Issues |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-02T14%3A17%3A45IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Partisanship,%20Political%20Institutions,%20and%20Debt%20Issues&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20law,%20economics,%20&%20organization&rft.au=Peskowitz,%20Zachary&rft.date=2018-08-01&rft.volume=34&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=395&rft.epage=424&rft.pages=395-424&rft.issn=8756-6222&rft.eissn=1465-7341&rft_id=info:doi/10.1093/jleo/ewy010&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_cross%3E48554844%3C/jstor_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=48554844&rft_oup_id=10.1093/jleo/ewy010&rfr_iscdi=true |