Social Lobbying
We theorize that direct social lobbying—the meeting of a lobbyist and public official outside of a formal office—persuades officials to support publicly policies favored by interest groups. Social lobbying influences public officials because the social environment allows for greater receptivity to i...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Journal of politics 2022-01, Vol.84 (1), p.367-382 |
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| container_end_page | 382 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
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| container_title | The Journal of politics |
| container_volume | 84 |
| creator | Grose, Christian R. Lopez, Pamela Sadhwani, Sara Yoshinaka, Antoine |
| description | We theorize that direct social lobbying—the meeting of a lobbyist and public official outside of a formal office—persuades officials to support publicly policies favored by interest groups. Social lobbying influences public officials because the social environment allows for greater receptivity to interest group messages. A randomized field experiment was conducted by a lobbying firm in a US state legislature. Legislators randomly assigned to be socially lobbied more frequently expressed public support for the interest group’s preferred policy than did legislators lobbied in their offices or not contacted by the lobbyist. In addition, an original survey of registered lobbyists was conducted in 10 US states demonstrating that social lobbying regularly occurs. Political elites are influenced by the social environment; interest group direct lobbying is influential when conducted in places not easily observed by the public. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1086/714923 |
| format | Article |
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Social lobbying influences public officials because the social environment allows for greater receptivity to interest group messages. A randomized field experiment was conducted by a lobbying firm in a US state legislature. Legislators randomly assigned to be socially lobbied more frequently expressed public support for the interest group’s preferred policy than did legislators lobbied in their offices or not contacted by the lobbyist. In addition, an original survey of registered lobbyists was conducted in 10 US states demonstrating that social lobbying regularly occurs. Political elites are influenced by the social environment; interest group direct lobbying is influential when conducted in places not easily observed by the public.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-3816</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1468-2508</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/714923</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Interest groups ; Legislators ; Legislatures ; Lobbying ; Lobbyists ; Political elites ; Political parties ; Public officials ; Public opinion ; Receptivity ; Social environment ; Social groups ; State legislatures ; States</subject><ispartof>The Journal of politics, 2022-01, Vol.84 (1), p.367-382</ispartof><rights>2021 Southern Political Science Association. 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Social lobbying influences public officials because the social environment allows for greater receptivity to interest group messages. A randomized field experiment was conducted by a lobbying firm in a US state legislature. Legislators randomly assigned to be socially lobbied more frequently expressed public support for the interest group’s preferred policy than did legislators lobbied in their offices or not contacted by the lobbyist. In addition, an original survey of registered lobbyists was conducted in 10 US states demonstrating that social lobbying regularly occurs. Political elites are influenced by the social environment; interest group direct lobbying is influential when conducted in places not easily observed by the public.</description><subject>Interest groups</subject><subject>Legislators</subject><subject>Legislatures</subject><subject>Lobbying</subject><subject>Lobbyists</subject><subject>Political elites</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Public officials</subject><subject>Public opinion</subject><subject>Receptivity</subject><subject>Social environment</subject><subject>Social groups</subject><subject>State legislatures</subject><subject>States</subject><issn>0022-3816</issn><issn>1468-2508</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNpFz01LxDAQBuAgCtb14y8IirfqzCRNk6Msq7tQ8KCeQ5qma5d1U5PtYf-9lS44c5jLwzu8jF0jPCIo-VSi0MRPWIZCqpwKUKcsAyDKuUJ5zi5S2sA4UouM3bwH19ntbRXq-tDt1pfsrLXb5K-Od8Y-XxYf82Vevb2u5s9V7kjBPi89NTU6j-QFlLZs2saj4o6INOqCxLgSGuWsckq1ugbrJS8kCu-IU81n7G7K7WP4GXzam00Y4m58aUgSai5QwageJuViSCn61vSx-7bxYBDMX1kzlR3h_QQH99U5uw599Cn9Zx7ZL3OWT0U</recordid><startdate>20220101</startdate><enddate>20220101</enddate><creator>Grose, Christian R.</creator><creator>Lopez, Pamela</creator><creator>Sadhwani, Sara</creator><creator>Yoshinaka, Antoine</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>University of Chicago Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20220101</creationdate><title>Social Lobbying</title><author>Grose, Christian R. ; Lopez, Pamela ; Sadhwani, Sara ; Yoshinaka, Antoine</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-7e2db1ce12e407a7dfde183c22291952424260d8ca8c88f9b0ae635614ec232b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Interest groups</topic><topic>Legislators</topic><topic>Legislatures</topic><topic>Lobbying</topic><topic>Lobbyists</topic><topic>Political elites</topic><topic>Political parties</topic><topic>Public officials</topic><topic>Public opinion</topic><topic>Receptivity</topic><topic>Social environment</topic><topic>Social groups</topic><topic>State legislatures</topic><topic>States</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Grose, Christian R.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lopez, Pamela</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sadhwani, Sara</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Yoshinaka, Antoine</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Journal of politics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Grose, Christian R.</au><au>Lopez, Pamela</au><au>Sadhwani, Sara</au><au>Yoshinaka, Antoine</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Social Lobbying</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of politics</jtitle><date>2022-01-01</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>84</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>367</spage><epage>382</epage><pages>367-382</pages><issn>0022-3816</issn><eissn>1468-2508</eissn><abstract>We theorize that direct social lobbying—the meeting of a lobbyist and public official outside of a formal office—persuades officials to support publicly policies favored by interest groups. 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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0022-3816 |
| ispartof | The Journal of politics, 2022-01, Vol.84 (1), p.367-382 |
| issn | 0022-3816 1468-2508 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_714923 |
| source | EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Interest groups Legislators Legislatures Lobbying Lobbyists Political elites Political parties Public officials Public opinion Receptivity Social environment Social groups State legislatures States |
| title | Social Lobbying |
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