The Black Market Blues: The Political Costs of Illicit Currency Markets

Countries with high inflation and stringent currency regulations frequently have thriving black markets for dollars. We argue that the black market for dollars has important political consequences: it hurts the pocketbooks of many citizens and, therefore, reduces support for the government. Evidence...

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Veröffentlicht in:The Journal of politics 2020-10, Vol.82 (4), p.1217-1230
Hauptverfasser: Schiumerini, Luis, Steinberg, David A.
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description Countries with high inflation and stringent currency regulations frequently have thriving black markets for dollars. We argue that the black market for dollars has important political consequences: it hurts the pocketbooks of many citizens and, therefore, reduces support for the government. Evidence from Argentina supports this argument. Using aggregate time series data, we estimate that a 10% increase in the black market price of the dollar relative to the official price reduces presidential approval by 2–5 percentage points in the long run. To test the pocketbook mechanism more directly, we use individual-level data from a list experiment. We find that people who bought dollars on the black market were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for the incumbent party in the 2015 presidential election. These findings suggest that the black market for dollars can have important political consequences.
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source PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete
subjects Aggregate data
Black markets
Exchange rate policy
Foreign exchange markets
Individual differences
Inflation
Market shares
Money
Political economy
Political parties
Presidential approval
Presidential elections
Prices
Regulation
Time series
Voting
title The Black Market Blues: The Political Costs of Illicit Currency Markets
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