A Theory of Epistemic Risk

A Theory of Epistemic Risk

I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Philosophy of science 2019-07, Vol.86 (3), p.522-550
1. Verfasser: Babic, Boris
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Bayesian analysis
Entropy
Entropy (Information theory)
Epistemology
Error detection
Risk
Utility theory
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 550
container_issue 3
container_start_page 522
container_title Philosophy of science
container_volume 86
creator Babic, Boris
description I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).
doi_str_mv 10.1086/703552
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_703552</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2277048569</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-986be5339d6907eb3d409995a84e724d1c1373754a174f1f4f948d92430bfd413</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNpFz0tLxDAUBeAgCtZRf4CrguKuem8eTbIchvEBA4KM4C60aeJ0dExN2sX8eysdcHU2H-dwCLlEuENQ5b0EJgQ9IhkKpgtZyvdjkgEwLBTl6pScpbQFQFSgMnI1z9cbF-I-Dz5fdm3q3a61-WubPs_Jia--krs45Iy8PSzXi6di9fL4vJivCksV9IVWZe0EY7opNUhXs4aD1lpUijtJeYMWmWRS8Aol9-i511w1mnIGtW84shm5nnq7GH4Gl3qzDUP8HicNpVICV6LUo7qdlI0hpei86WK7q-LeIJi_32b6PcKbCQ5209rqI3TRpfTfeWC_BUVSWA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2277048569</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>A Theory of Epistemic Risk</title><source>Cambridge Journals Online</source><creator>Babic, Boris</creator><creatorcontrib>Babic, Boris</creatorcontrib><description>I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).</description><identifier>ISSN: 0031-8248</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1539-767X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1086/703552</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Cambridge: The University of Chicago Press</publisher><subject>Bayesian analysis ; Entropy ; Entropy (Information theory) ; Epistemology ; Error detection ; Risk ; Utility theory</subject><ispartof>Philosophy of science, 2019-07, Vol.86 (3), p.522-550</ispartof><rights>Copyright 2019 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.</rights><rights>Copyright University of Chicago, acting through its Press Jul 2019</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-986be5339d6907eb3d409995a84e724d1c1373754a174f1f4f948d92430bfd413</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-986be5339d6907eb3d409995a84e724d1c1373754a174f1f4f948d92430bfd413</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Babic, Boris</creatorcontrib><title>A Theory of Epistemic Risk</title><title>Philosophy of science</title><description>I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).</description><subject>Bayesian analysis</subject><subject>Entropy</subject><subject>Entropy (Information theory)</subject><subject>Epistemology</subject><subject>Error detection</subject><subject>Risk</subject><subject>Utility theory</subject><issn>0031-8248</issn><issn>1539-767X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNpFz0tLxDAUBeAgCtZRf4CrguKuem8eTbIchvEBA4KM4C60aeJ0dExN2sX8eysdcHU2H-dwCLlEuENQ5b0EJgQ9IhkKpgtZyvdjkgEwLBTl6pScpbQFQFSgMnI1z9cbF-I-Dz5fdm3q3a61-WubPs_Jia--krs45Iy8PSzXi6di9fL4vJivCksV9IVWZe0EY7opNUhXs4aD1lpUijtJeYMWmWRS8Aol9-i511w1mnIGtW84shm5nnq7GH4Gl3qzDUP8HicNpVICV6LUo7qdlI0hpei86WK7q-LeIJi_32b6PcKbCQ5209rqI3TRpfTfeWC_BUVSWA</recordid><startdate>20190701</startdate><enddate>20190701</enddate><creator>Babic, Boris</creator><general>The University of Chicago Press</general><general>Cambridge University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20190701</creationdate><title>A Theory of Epistemic Risk</title><author>Babic, Boris</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c280t-986be5339d6907eb3d409995a84e724d1c1373754a174f1f4f948d92430bfd413</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>Bayesian analysis</topic><topic>Entropy</topic><topic>Entropy (Information theory)</topic><topic>Epistemology</topic><topic>Error detection</topic><topic>Risk</topic><topic>Utility theory</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Babic, Boris</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Babic, Boris</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>A Theory of Epistemic Risk</atitle><jtitle>Philosophy of science</jtitle><date>2019-07-01</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>86</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>522</spage><epage>550</epage><pages>522-550</pages><issn>0031-8248</issn><eissn>1539-767X</eissn><abstract>I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy (a quantity also known as generalized information entropy). This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors in Bayesian epistemology more generally (including the Laplacean principle of indifference).</abstract><cop>Cambridge</cop><pub>The University of Chicago Press</pub><doi>10.1086/703552</doi><tpages>29</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0031-8248
ispartof Philosophy of science, 2019-07, Vol.86 (3), p.522-550
issn 0031-8248
1539-767X
language eng
recordid cdi_crossref_primary_10_1086_703552
source Cambridge Journals Online
subjects Bayesian analysis
Entropy
Entropy (Information theory)
Epistemology
Error detection
Risk
Utility theory
title A Theory of Epistemic Risk
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2024-12-25T15%3A01%3A28IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=A%20Theory%20of%20Epistemic%20Risk&rft.jtitle=Philosophy%20of%20science&rft.au=Babic,%20Boris&rft.date=2019-07-01&rft.volume=86&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=522&rft.epage=550&rft.pages=522-550&rft.issn=0031-8248&rft.eissn=1539-767X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1086/703552&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2277048569%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2277048569&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true